Last month was marked by the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) application of business-justification reasoning across a range of sectors. Following a full investigation, the CCI closed an inquiry into BookMyShow on merits, upholding BMS’s commercial justifications across most of the alleged abuses. The CCI closed four other cases at the threshold stage, drawing clear jurisdictional and evidentiary lines. We discuss these cases further below.

1. The CCI closes the BookMyShow case, upholding business justifications for exclusive ticketing agreements (see here)

The CCI’s order on BookMyShow is a significant post-investigation closure. The informant, a competing online ticketing portal, alleged that BookMyShow (BMS) abused its dominant position in the market for online intermediation services for booking of movie tickets in India under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) through exclusive agreements with cinemas, discriminatory revenue sharing, and restrictive data ownership clauses.

The CCI confirmed BMS’ dominance. The Director General (DG) found BMS’s market share in the relevant market ranging between 70-80% in booking volume, with first-mover advantage from 2007, extensive vertical integration, and strong network effects. Both the CCI and the DG noted that other players such as Amazon and Justickets chose to collaborate with BMS rather than compete independently, a telling indicator of market power.1

The substantive analysis, however, is instructive. The CCI diverged from the DG’s conclusion on all 4 allegations of abuse of dominance.

Seat reservation. The CCI accepted BMS’s explanation that reserving a portion of seat inventory in single screen cinemas in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities is a practical necessity. BMS submitted that single screen cinemas lack real-time integration technology and this practice avoided double booking seats. It also clarified that unsold seats are returned to the theatre to be sold through the box-office before each show. The DG did not find BMS’s explanation plausible, and concluded that the seat reservation practice actually served to implement BMS’ arrangements with other aggregators, and amounted to the imposition of an unfair condition on single screen cinemas. However, the CCI disagreed, noting that the DG’s conclusion was based on its review of a single agreement and was insufficient to establish a broader pattern of abusive conduct.

Discriminatory data and revenue sharing. The DG found that BMS co-owned customer data with large multiplexes, but shared only hashed data with single-screen cinemas, and that BMS offered materially different revenue shares to different cinemas. In both cases, the DG concluded that BMS exploited its market position to impose discriminatory conditions on weaker counterparties. The CCI overturned both findings on the same legal principle - the prohibition on discriminatory conduct under the Competition Act applies only where the dominant enterprise treats similarly-situated parties unequally. Single-screen cinemas and large multiplexes are not similarly situated. They differ materially in infrastructure, data handling capability, operational scale, and commercial significance. Since the two categories of cinemas do not constitute a homogenous class, no case of discriminatory abuse could be made out on either count.

Market foreclosure. The DG and the CCI analysed the nature of BMS’ exclusivity arrangements. BMS itself admitted to entering into short-term exclusive agreements that bar cinemas from directly or indirectly engaging any other party to facilitate online or remote ticket booking. The DG’s data showed that BMS had exclusive or quasi-exclusive arrangements. Under the exclusive agreements, cinemas could not independently appoint any third-party aggregator. Under non-exclusive agreements, the number of third-party aggregators a cinema could appoint was capped, meaning market access was restricted even without formal exclusivity. These arrangements were typically accompanied by interest-free security deposits or adjustable advances, and lock-in periods ranging from one to seven years, with termination clauses in many agreements operable only upon breach, meaning cinemas had no unilateral right of exit. While the DG concluded that this resulted in market foreclosure, the CCI ultimately found that the lock-in periods were commercially justified as recovery mechanisms for the advances paid, and that the staggered expiry of agreements meant the market was never fully foreclosed at any given time. The CCI concluded that the DG had not established the actual scale of foreclosure with sufficient clarity, since its analysis rested on a limited sample of agreements.

This order is an important marker for platform operators with exclusive distribution arrangements. The CCI appears willing to accept commercially coherent business justifications that are supported by evidence for practices that structurally entrench market position. This marks a deviation from the CCI’s approach in earlier digital markets cases,2 where it inferred harm (i.e. market foreclosure) from the structural design of the platforms’ arrangements, that further entrenched the platforms’ dominance in each case. In BookMyShow, the CCI applied a higher evidentiary bar, possibly reflecting the appellate pressure from Schott Glass (Supreme Court, 2025), which mandated proof of actual or potential anti-competitive effects in abuse of dominance cases.

Despite the apparent inconsistency in the CCI’s approach to platform conduct across these cases, businesses should document the commercial rationale for exclusivity arrangements, lock-in periods, and differential terms. They should also expect the kind of granular, agreement-level analysis that the DG attempted in BookMyShow to become the baseline for future investigations.

2. Four cases closed at threshold: insufficient evidence, wrong forum, and the limits of competition law

The CCI also closed four cases at the threshold stage under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. Taken together, these closures reinforce three consistent principles: the CCI is not a substitute for sector-specific regulators unless there is a competition concern, competition law does not remedy individual commercial grievances, and complaints that are not backed by sufficient evidence of market-wide harm do not clear the threshold for initiating an investigation under the Competition Act.

Rapido — a matter for transport regulation. The CCI closed a complaint alleging that Rapido deploys unlicensed, white-plate motorcycles for its bike-taxi service. According to the informant (a competitor), this enabled it to undercut licensed rivals by 15-30% by avoiding the cost of commercial permits, insurance, and fitness certification. The CCI’s answer was unambiguous: whether Rapido’s vehicles comply with commercial transport requirements is a matter for the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The CCI found no evidence of a competition concern under the Competition Act and closed the case accordingly.

IndiGo and Air India — no collective dominance, and contractual dissatisfaction is not a competition concern. The CCI closed a complaint alleging that IndiGo and Air India coordinated on cancellation charges amounting to over 75% of the ticket price. Two important legal principles emerge. First, on cartel allegations, parallel pricing (i.e. similar cancellation charges) without evidence of coordination does not establish a concerted practice under Section 3(3) of the Competition Act. Second, and more fundamentally, the Competition Act does not recognise collective dominance. Section 4 is premised on a single enterprise holding a dominant position, and only that enterprise can be found to have abused such dominance. On the substance, the CCI noted that cancellation terms were publicly disclosed, uniformly applied, and voluntarily accepted by consumers at the time of booking. The informant also unsuccessfully attempted to merge this case with the ongoing DG investigation into IndiGo’s mass flight cancellations in December 2025. The CCI noted that the two cases are factually distinct. In the IndiGo investigation, it is the airline’s own unilateral conduct that allegedly harmed passengers who had no prior notice or recourse. Here, the consumer cancelled voluntarily, under terms published and agreed when making the booking. Dissatisfaction with a contractual bargain is not a competition concern, and the CCI made clear that the remedy lies elsewhere.

Zucol v. Google Play Store — individual grievances do not reopen established jurisprudence. The CCI also closed proceedings against Google, following complaints relating to the termination of a developer’s accounts for malware policy violations. While the CCI confirmed Google’s dominance in the market for app stores for Android OS in India, it closed the case for three reasons. First, the informant’s submissions to the CCI were inconsistent and withheld material facts.3 Second, Google had already reinstated the account in September 2025, a fact the informant withheld from the CCI. Third, the CCI reiterated its position in Liberty Infospace, that the terms and conditions in Google’s Developer Distribution Agreement, Developer Program Policy, and Relation Ban Policy are standard industry practice and that its appeals process is neither abusive nor discriminatory. The CCI’s order indicates that platform policy enforcement supported by transparent, consistently-applied policies aimed at ensuring platform safety and security, will survive threshold scrutiny for competition concerns.

BESCOM — bid-rigging requires proof of coordination between bidders, not just a procurement process the complainant disagrees with. The CCI also closed a complaint alleging that the Bangalore Electricity Supply Company (BESCOM) structured a smart meter tender to favour two specific bidders. The informant alleged that BESCOM deviated from Karnataka’s standard procurement framework and suppressing the estimated contract value to artificially lower qualification thresholds. The CCI reviewed the statutory framework governing public procurement in Karnataka and found that BESCOM’s modifications were legally permissible. On comparative pricing, the CCI’s analysis of life cycle costs across six states showed BESCOM’s rates to be broadly comparable, with variations explained by differences in tenure, scope, and quantity. Critically, on the cartelisation allegation, the informant’s evidence related only to BESCOM’s conduct as procurer. There was no material indicating that the two bidders had acted in concert. This order reiterates the evidentiary standard for inquiring into potential bid rigging, and also emphasises the CCI’s view upholding procurers’ discretion to set tender conditions to suit their requirements.

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India’s merger control framework requires companies to notify the Competition Commission of India (”CCI”) and obtain prior approval before implementing a transaction that meets the prescribed thresholds under the Competition Act, 2002 (“Competition Act”), unless they are statutorily exempt. The Competition (Criteria for Exemption of Combinations) Rules, 2024 (”Exemption Rules“) set out twelve categories of exempt transactions.

Item 8 of the Exemption Rules covers a set of transactions that companies and their boards typically regard as entirely routine - share acquisitions through bonus issues, stock splits, buy backs or rights issues that do not result in a change in control.

The exemption rests on a straightforward premise: these corporate actions ordinarily affect the mechanics of shareholding without affecting the substance of governance. The shareholders who controlled the company before the action continue to control it in the same way after. That premise is reflected in the final condition of the exemption: “not leading to a change in control.” This is the operative condition on which the entire exemption rests. When a corporate action results in a change in control as a matter of objective fact, the exemption does not apply and a notification obligation is triggered. If the action has already been implemented (i.e., the shares allotted), the acquirer is exposed to “gun jumping” penalty proceedings.

How Each Action Can Produce a Change in Control

The CCI’s Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) confirm that the exemption is assessed based on the objective outcome of the corporate action, rather than the shareholder’s intent. The FAQs clarify that transacting parties must be mindful of three material shareholding based “control” thresholds:

1. 25%, at which a shareholder acquires the ability to block special resolutions and thereby exercises joint control;

2. 50%, at which it acquires sole control over ordinary resolutions; and

3. 75%, at which it acquires sole control over special resolutions as well.

When a corporate action causes a shareholder’s stake to cross any of these thresholds, the exemption is not available, even if the change was neither anticipated nor intended. Conversely, the target’s control could also change if a shareholder’s stake falls below any of these thresholds.

The text of the Item 8 Exemption is deceptively simple. However, practical realities may lead to significant complexities. Consider for instance:

1. In a buyback, the company purchases its own shares from those shareholders who choose to tender, and cancels them. A shareholder that chooses not to sell sees its proportionate holding increase automatically, because the same absolute number of shares now represents a higher percentage of a reduced share capital. This shareholder has not actively acquired anything. Nevertheless, if its shareholding crosses one of the three control thresholds identified above, it has acquired control for the purposes of the Competition Act, and a notifiable combination has occurred.

2. In a rights issue, a similar problem arises when shareholders do not exercise their entitlement in proportion to their existing holdings. If a shareholder allows its rights to lapse or renounces its entitlement, another shareholder may, unintentionally, end up with a significantly larger shareholding. If that stake crosses a control threshold, the exemption does not apply.

3. In a bonus issue, this issue presents itself in complex capital structures involving multiple classes of shares or where shareholders have differential voting rights. If a bonus issue disproportionately increases the voting weight of one class over another, it can inadvertently push a shareholder across a control threshold.

4. Stock splits and consolidations of face value present the least risk as they simply re-denominate existing shares. For instance, if fractional entitlements in a consolidation are rounded down and cashed out, slightly reducing total share capital and nudging a major shareholder’s percentage upward across a threshold.

The Problem: When the Exemption Falls Away, the Framework Struggles to Respond

Even where a company and its shareholders recognise that a buy back, rights issue, bonus issue, stock split or consolidation has produced a change in control, three questions arise that the existing framework does not cleanly resolve: who notifies, at what stage, and on what basis.

Who Notifies? The Competition Act places the notification obligation on the acquirer. In a conventional bilateral acquisition, this is straightforward. In a buy back, rights issue, bonus issue, stock split or consolidation, it is not. The current merger control framework is unclear on several aspects - the practical feasibility of such shareholders taking on the obligation to notify such acquisitions, particularly when the shareholder crosses the control threshold on account of the actions of other shareholders or the company itself, and when the notification obligation arises.

1. In a buyback, it is the party that chose not to participate that may “acquire” control. That shareholder has paid nothing, signed nothing, and actively chose to do nothing.

2. In a rights issue, the shareholder that crosses a control threshold will only know that it has done so at the end of the offer period, once all other shareholders have decided whether to take up, renounce, or allow their entitlements to lapse.

3. In a bonus issue, stock split, or consolidation, no shareholder takes any action at all. If a proportionate holding crosses a control threshold, the notification obligation has no obvious bearer, neither the company nor the affected shareholder has made an acquisition.

At What Stage? In a bilateral acquisition, the notification trigger is the execution of a binding agreement or any other document that reflects the intention to acquire. The standstill obligation (i.e., the obligation not to give effect to any part of a notifiable transaction before the CCI approves a notifiable transaction) applies from that point. Corporate actions such as a buy back or a rights issue have no equivalent trigger document - it is possible to determine whether any shareholder has crossed a control threshold only after the offer period closes, i.e., when the corporate action is effectively implemented. In a bonus issue, stock split, or consolidation, there is no offer period: the corporate action and the change in shareholding are simultaneous. In each case, the change in control may be determinable only at the moment it has already occurred.

On What Basis? A further difficulty arises where the change in control takes place not by one shareholder increasing its holding, but by another shareholder’s shareholding reducing below a threshold. Consider this example. Company X has two shareholders: Shareholder A holding seventy percent and Shareholder B holding thirty percent. Company X conducts a buy back in which Shareholder B tenders all its shares. Shareholder A has not participated. Its absolute number of shares is unchanged. As a result, Shareholder A has moved from a position of joint control to sole control. Is Shareholder A obligated to notify the CCI? It has neither acquired any shares, signed any document, nor taken any positive step towards an acquisition of shares. The change in its shareholding is entirely a consequence of another shareholder’s decision. The CCI’s jurisprudence on control recognises that any shift along the spectrum of control is sufficient to trigger the notification obligation - including one shareholder acquiring sole control to pass special resolutions or another shareholder losing the ability to block special resolutions (as will be the case in this example). But the Competition Act’s notification framework is built around the premise of an acquirer taking a positive act of acquisition. Where no such act has occurred, the framework offers no clear answer.

The same question may arise in a rights issue where a shareholder does not participate, and its stake is diluted to below 25%. Even if another shareholder does not acquire the ability to pass special resolutions by virtue of its shareholding there has been a “change in control” for the purposes of the Competition Act simply on account of the other shareholder’s stake falling below 25%.

These scenarios illustrate a structural gap: the substantive competition law analysis asks whether control has changed, but the procedural notification architecture requires a positive act of acquisition to identify the party responsible for notifying. Corporate actions can produce one without the other. Further complicating matters, the merger control regime places gun-jumping liability on the party responsible for notification.

Does CCI’s decisional practice provide any answers?

CCI’s decisional practice confirms that such instances of passive crossing of control thresholds resulting from routine corporate actions will be treated as notifiable events, and a non-notification may invite gun-jumping penalties.

In CPPIB/ReNew (C-2022/06/936), CPPIB did not participate in a buy back and specifically argued that the resultant increase in its proportionate shareholding was protected under the erstwhile exemption, and only notified the transaction by way of abundant caution. The CCI rejected this argument, establishing that an automatic increase in voting rights beyond the 25% threshold due to a buy back confers negative control and triggers mandatory notification, despite the shareholder’s complete lack of active participation.

This strict approach towards passive changes in control was reinforced in Bharti Airtel/Indus Towers (C-2024/08/1173). In that case, Indus Towers’ buy back passively pushed Bharti Airtel’s stake over the 50% control threshold, as it did not participate in the process. In both cases, the shareholders with an increased shareholding notified the CCI.

The clear takeaway - had either shareholder relied solely on the exemption and not notified, they would have likely faced gun jumping proceedings and statutory penalties under the Competition Act.

What Could Be Done

To address these issues, shareholders and companies may consider the following:

1. Pre-assess the impact on the target’s cap table: Before any buy back, rights issue, or bonus issue is approved, shareholders who may be close to any of these control thresholds should map the target’s shareholding structure and assess whether they could cross any of them as a result of the proposed action. In a buy back or rights issue, it is not possible to predict the level of participation in advance, so the analysis should model a range of scenarios, including the most extreme cases where the shareholders definitively cross these thresholds (for example, assuming none of the other shareholders participate in a rights issue).

2. Where the notifying party is unclear, use the Pre-Filing Consultation (PFC) process. The CCI’s PFC mechanism allows parties to seek informal (albeit non-binding and verbal) guidance without committing to a formal filing. Where the allocation of the notification obligation is genuinely uncertain, for instance in a rights issue or bonus issue, engaging with the CCI through this route before the corporate action takes effect could help avoid penalties for gun jumping.

3. Filing concurrently with the trigger: Under SEBI’s rights issue process, rights issues must be completed within 23 working days from board approval. Where a rights issue could potentially trigger a notification obligation, the parties should notify the CCI as soon as board approval is received and advocate for expedited review within the 23 working day timeline. However, since the Competition Act allows for a 30 day Phase I review process, parties run the risk of gun jumping penalties if the 23 working day timeline runs out and allotment occurs, before the CCI has completed its review. To mitigate this risk, acquirers should immediately engage with the CCI through the PFC mechanism to explore whether allotted shares can be placed in escrow pending final approval, a workaround the CCI has permitted for on-market purchases under the 2023 amendments. While an escrow arrangement would not entirely eliminate the possibility of gun-jumping liability, it preserves the competitive status quo, prevents premature exercise of control rights, and demonstrates good faith to the CCI.

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Over the past month, the Indian antitrust landscape witnessed some significant developments across various sectors. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) and appellate courts tackled questions of jurisdictional boundaries with sectoral regulators, the exclusionary effects of warranty policies on parallel imports, the application of limitation periods to labour-market cartels, and the classification of statutory bodies as “enterprises”.

We discuss these developments below.

1. CCI asserts jurisdiction over the aviation sector to scrutinise IndiGo’s conduct (see here)

On 4 February, the CCI initiated a probe into IndiGo following allegations that the airline abruptly cancelled hundreds of flights in December 2025, creating a system-wide capacity shock, and subsequently charged passengers exorbitant fares for alternate flights.

Jurisdictional challenge. IndiGo raised a preliminary jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the aviation sector is comprehensively governed by the Bhartiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 and the Aircraft Rules, 1937, placing the issue within the exclusive domain of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). The CCI rejected this challenge, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bharti Airtel, to hold that sectoral regulation and competition law operate in distinct but complementary domains. The DGCA itself clarified that it does not possess economic regulatory powers to conduct competition law analysis.

CCI’s preliminary assessment. The CCI’s preliminary assessment defined the relevant market as the “market for domestic air passenger transport services in India.” This is a departure from the typical practice of identifying origin-destination city pairs used to define relevant markets in aviation cases, perhaps reflecting a wider, systemic approach to the CCI’s analysis. The CCI found IndiGo to be prima facie dominant, considering its market share by number of passengers and seat capacity for the preceding two financial years, net profitability, and its extensive network coverage (prevalence across high-frequency routes and several routes where IndiGo is the only operator). The CCI determined that IndiGo’s last minute cancellations left passengers with no real choice but to seek alternate flights at significantly higher prices, which prima facie violated Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act). The CCI also found that by cancelling a significant portion of its scheduled capacity, IndiGo deliberately withheld services, creating an artificial scarcity and limiting consumer access during a peak demand period, in violation of Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act.

The order reinforces the CCI’s view that the existence of a specialised sectoral regulator (like the DGCA) does not oust the CCI’s jurisdiction over anti-competitive conduct. The CCI’s view is actively being tested before the Supreme Court in the context of patents-related disputes and data protection issues. The CCI’s order is notable for the detailed evidence reviewed at this preliminary stage. While not unusual, the CCI is not legally obliged at this preliminary stage to seek input from opposing parties, third parties, or regulatory bodies.

2. Chipping away at parallel imports: Intel penalised for discriminatory warranty policy (see here)

On 12 February, the CCI penalised Intel Corporation (Intel) for abusing its dominant position in respect of warranty terms for boxed microprocessors (BMP), which disadvantaged parallel importers vis-a-vis Intel’s own authorised distribution network. This change was implemented in 2016 and restricted warranty services to only those BMPs purchased from an authorised Indian distributor. This meant that genuine Intel BMPs imported through parallel channels were refused local warranty service, with customers instead directed to the original country of purchase.

Relevant market and dominance. The CCI found Intel dominant in the market for “Boxed Microprocessors for Desktop PCs in India” based on its sustained high market share over a five-year period (2016-2021), as well as its considerable technological and financial resources. The CCI dismissed Intel’s argument that market share fluctuations negated its dominance, observing that its closest competitor, AMD had never surpassed Intel as the market leader during this five-year span.

Unfair and discriminatory terms. The CCI held that the India-specific warranty conditions were an unfair and discriminatory condition violating Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Competition Act. The informant, a parallel importer, argued that parallel imports were beneficial for the Indian market by enhancing price competition between local distributors and offering a wider range of products. Parallel importers capitalized on price differences for Intel BMPs purchased in and outside India, by importing BMPs from countries where authorised distributors sell them cheaper, often at significantly lower prices (between 44-133% depending on the model) than Intel’s authorized Indian distributors. Occasionally, they also introduce models to the Indian market sooner than the authorized network. By restricting warranty services within India, Intel’s policy effectively drove up the cost of warranty services for imported BMPs (or risk repairs with less reliable third parties, with non-genuine parts) and forced parallel importers to sell at a discount. As such, Intel’s revised policy effectively rendered parallel imports unviable, by putting parallel importers at a commercial disadvantage, nudging them to purchase from authorised distributors.

Limiting choice. By rendering parallel imports unviable, the CCI noted that Intel’s policy also limited the choice of end consumers and parallel importers, forcing them to purchase BMPs from authorised Indian distributors at higher prices. The evidence showed Intel’s withdrawal of its channel supplier program and revised warranty policy to nudge independent traders to purchase from its authorised distribution channel. The warranty restriction also limited the availability of newer BMP models through parallel importers before they were introduced in the Indian market through its authorised distributors. The CCI held that this conduct amounted to an artificial restriction and limitation of the market in contravention of Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Competition Act.

Denial of market access. Finally, the CCI concluded that this strategy structurally disadvantaged parallel importers, leading to a decline in their sales while the sales of Intel’s authorised distributors surged, thereby resulting in a targeted denial of market access in violation of Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act.

While the CCI has previously permitted some restrictive warranty conditions to safeguard the integrity of authorised distribution channels and ensure the servicing of only genuine products, the CCI’s review in this instance focused on the broader exclusionary impact of the warranty policy on parallel importers. The CCI ultimately viewed the use of after-sales services or warranties as a tool to ring-fence authorized distribution, thereby deeming it an exclusionary practice.

Penalty and remedies. After adjusting the 8% base penalty rate downwards to account for mitigating factors such as the withdrawal of the revised warranty policy, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 27.38 crore. In addition, the CCI imposed behavioural remedies, directing Intel to widely publicise the withdrawal of the restrictive warranty policy to spread consumer awareness.

3. The Delhi High Court green lights CCI probe into labour-market cartel (see here)

International Flavours and Fragrances (IFF) filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court (DHC) challenging a CCI order directing an investigation into alleged labour-related coordination (wage-fixing and no-poach agreements) among global fragrance manufacturers. IFF argued that the information was filed beyond the three-year limitation period prescribed under the Competition Act, and that the CCI erred in initiating the investigation. However, the CCI had condoned the delay, noting that the informant demonstrated “sufficient cause” by acting promptly after conducting internal investigations triggered by global dawn raids in March 2023 and the notification of the new Lesser Penalty regulations in 2024. Crucially, the CCI justified the condonation by observing that the alleged anti-competitive labour coordination may still be ongoing, thereby constituting a continuing cause of action.

The DHC concurred with the CCI’s rationale, refusing to interdict the investigation. While acknowledging IFF’s legal submissions on the strict nature of limitation rules, the DHC held that general principles of limitation may not have a direct bearing at this threshold phase, especially when the CCI as an expert regulator found strong reasons to condone the delay. The DHC also reiterated the Supreme Court’s ruling in CCI vs. SAIL that a direction to investigate under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act is merely an administrative direction, and did not warrant judicial interference, thereby allowing the cartel probe to proceed. The investigation signals the CCI’s active entry into policing labour-market cartels, aligning with global antitrust trends targeting no-poach and wage-fixing agreements.

4. Regulatory Flip-Flop: NCLAT stays CCI closure order based on its jurisdiction over statutory bodies (See here)

On 24 February, the NCLAT stayed a CCI order under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, closing an inquiry against the Haryana Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) for charging External Development Charges (EDC) from real estate developers without undertaking the corresponding development work, and imposing one-sided, arbitrary and discriminatory conditions for the grant of licenses to developers to undertake real estate development.

In 2018, the CCI initiated an investigation into DTCP’s conduct, holding that DTCP was an “enterprise” within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act. At the time, the CCI held that the levy of EDC could not be construed as a sovereign function (outside the purview of the Competition Act), since it had a “direct economic/commercial impact” on the commercial activities of developers. The CCI also granted developers interim relief against coercive collections of the EDC. DTCP then issued an order in 2019 complying with the CCI’s directions on interim relief. Relying on the government’s promise to follow these directions, the developers agreed to withdraw the case, and the CCI closed the matter in July 2022. However, in 2024, DTCP withdrew its compliance order, claiming their previous commitment was no longer in operation, since the CCI proceedings were closed.

When the informants approached the CCI again, it dismissed the information for two main reasons. First, the Punjab & Haryana High Court (affirmed by the Supreme Court) had already established developers’ obligation to pay EDC, irrespective of whether the authority undertook the external development work. The CCI refused to “reagitate” settled issues, in the interest of “judicial propriety”. Second, the CCI held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the allegations of arbitrary and one-sided conditions for the grant of developer licenses, since these conditions were determined by DTCP in its capacity as a statutory / regulatory authority. The CCI relied on the DHC’s ruling in ICAI v. CCI (2023) that its powers do not extend to “addressing any grievance regarding arbitrary action by any statutory authority”.

The developers appealed this decision to the NCLAT, which intervened to stay the CCI’s jurisdictional findings and restrained the Haryana government from taking any “coercive steps” against the developers’ licenses, until the appeal is heard. The NCLAT observed that the CCI’s shift in legal interpretation to be a “contradictory view” required deeper scrutiny.

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Enforcement Agility: CCI’s revamped enforcement toolkit. In her special address, the CCI Chairperson Ravneet Kaur showcased significant enforcement milestones following the significant amendments to the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) in 2023.

• The Chairperson pointed to the successful resolution of the CCI’s first settlement proposal in the Android Smart TV ecosystem. By securing structural and behavioural remedies without exhaustive litigation, the CCI demonstrated how settlements enable “quick market correction” before network effects irreversibly tip the scales against competitors.

• She discussed the CCI’s progress in developing regulations to operationalise the 2023 amendments, flagging the CCI’s revised Cost of Production regulations that came into force in May 2025. She noted that these regulations provide an updated framework for evaluating predatory pricing allegations, in the context of digital platforms.

• The CCI Chairperson also discussed the CCI’s efficiency in enforcement. She highlighted the CCI’s nearly 90% disposal rate in antitrust inquiries, noting that the CCI has explored a range of remedies apart from penalties, which include cease-and-desist orders, contract modifications and mandatory competition compliance programmes. On the merger control front, she reinforced the CCI’s business-friendly posture, emphasising its 99% merger approval rate and its “solution-oriented” preference for voluntary modifications in complex mergers over blocking transactions entirely.

Digital Markets and the Ex-Ante Debate. In his keynote address, NITI Aayog Member Rajiv Gauba described the digital economy as a “structural break in market dynamics” driven by extreme network effects and data centrality. Acknowledging the proposed Digital Competition Bill’s ex-ante regime, Gauba advocated for a cautious, principle-based, and technology-neutral approach. He explicitly warned of the dangers of regulatory extremes, noting that while under-regulation entrenches gatekeepers, over-enforcement could curtail innovation, hampering India’s progress towards becoming a developed economy (Viksit Bharat).

Regulating the AI Frontier. AI emerged as the defining theme of the conference. Building on the October 2025 market study on AI and competition, CCI Chairperson Ravneet Kaur highlighted the the CCI’s self-audit guidance note in her special address. This proactive mechanism encourages enterprises to internally monitor AI development and deployment for hidden anti-competitive outcomes, such as algorithmic collusion and self-preferencing.

The Plenary Session on Competition and AI explored how rapid technological advancements are fundamentally reshaping market structures. Chaired by CCI Member Sweta Kakkad, the panel framed AI not merely as a technological layer, but as the new “infrastructure of productivity” that influences market entry and expansion. To manage risks such as data concentration and algorithmic bias, Ms. Kakkad endorsed the CCI’s self-audit mechanism as being a “practical and preventative compliance mechanism”, urging collaborative internal reviews by legal, technical, and business teams of AI-driven strategies that could have market-based implications.

During the panel discussion, Dr Nakul Gupta (MDI) highlighted the emerging dangers of “cross-layer dominance,” where control over upstream AI components impacts market structures in downstream layers. On the other hand, Dr. Risham Garg (NLU Delhi) strongly cautioned against heavy-handed regulatory intervention, noting that compliance burdens associated with stringent ex-ante rules (as in the EU) could create entry barriers for Indian startups. He commended India’s hybrid approach of ex-post enforcement coupled with self-audit guidelines, which provided Indian industry the “breathing space” to grow. Echoing this pro-innovation sentiment, startup founder Rajat Garg (MyUpchar) defended algorithmic dynamic pricing, arguing it drives competition and benefits consumers rather than inherently facilitating collusion. He also highlighted the feasibility of AI startups building applications on top of existing models.

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S&C mechanism at a glance: Two paths to finality

The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) olive branch is bifurcated into two distinct routes, depending on when a company chooses to come to the table:

• Commitments (Pre-Investigation): This early-exit option allows companies to address concerns before the Director General (DG) launches a full-scale, resource-heavy investigation. By offering voluntary modifications to their business conduct, firms can resolve the matter without a formal finding of guilt or any financial penalty.

• Settlements (Post-Investigation): This path opens only after the DG’s report is submitted but before the CCI issues a final verdict. While it avoids a formal admission of liability, it carries a financial cost, albeit with a 15% discount on the potential penalty. Critically, unlike commitments, a settlement order can act as a trigger for subsequent private compensation claims, a risk that may often outweigh the modest discount.

Incentive gap: Why the CCI’s olive branch is being left on the table

For corporate boards, shifting from a litigation-first strategy to the S&C regime is driven not by conscience but by evidence, clear, empirical proof that the risk of penalty outweighs the regime’s benefits. At this early stage, Indian boardrooms appear reluctant to act, given the absence of precedent on how the CCI will handle S&C applications, interpret “full disclosure,” or how the NCLAT will assess follow-on damages.

For now, the “incentives” fail the balance-sheet test for four key reasons:

• Timelines that discourage resolution: Under the S&C regime, companies have just 45 days to file a settlement application after receiving the DG report, with scope for discretionary time-extensions. Commitments fare no better: the window remains fixed at 45 days from the CCI’s initiation order directing investigation. For large enterprises, this timeframe is barely sufficient to assess evidence, quantify exposure, test remedies internally, secure board approvals, and evaluate litigation risk. The result is predictable, either no application at all, or hasty, defensive submissions that serve neither regulator nor regulated.

• The litigation dividend: In the Indian context, the appellate process often operates as a deliberate financial strategy. By appealing a CCI order, companies can defer massive penalty payments for several years, thereby preserving cash flow and balance-sheet flexibility during the pendency of litigation. To its credit, the legislature has sought to curb this behaviour by introducing a mandatory pre-deposit of 25% of the penalty amount as a condition for appeal, with the aim of discouraging frivolous challenges and ensuring that only serious appeals proceed. Yet, in practical terms, this reform blunts but does not eliminate the litigation dividend. The modest 15% discount, even when combined with savings in litigation costs, represents a weak trade-off for the total forfeiture of judicial review.

• Shadow of global turnover: The stakes were raised exponentially when the CCI shifted toward computing penalties based on global turnover. While Penalty Guidelines exist, the “worst-case scenario” remains a terrifying prospect (and is currently being challenged in the Delhi High Court). When boards crunch the numbers, they aren’t looking at the 15% they might save; they are looking at the 85% they may potentially be required to pay upfront after arriving at a settlement.

• Trojan horse of private claims: The board of directors must also account for hidden costs. Choosing a settlement may inadvertently trigger a wave of private claims. Even without a formal “finding of guilt,” a settlement order can supply a factual foundation that claimants may use to sidestep the burden of proving a contravention from scratch, leaving the door wide open to substantial civil damages.

Learnings globally and the case for a sweeter deal

The sluggish start to India’s S&C regime stands in stark contrast to jurisdictions elsewhere, where negotiated outcomes have graduated from an alternative to the default norm. In the United States, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) resolve approximately 70% to 90% of civil antitrust cases via consent decrees. For companies, the certainty of a negotiated settlement is a vital defensive manoeuvre against the devastating threat of treble damages that often follow a courtroom defeat. The European experience tells a similar story of pragmatism. The European Commission successfully utilises its commitment decisions to resolve nearly half of its abuse of dominance probes, without imposing any financial penalty at all.

Way ahead: a calibrated path

To improve the commercial viability of the S&C framework, two calibrated reforms merit consideration:

First, institutionalise structured pre-filing engagement: a formal consultation window, modelled on the pre-filing interactions already undertaken by the CCI in the combination review process, and anchored in defined timelines and procedural safeguards, would enable parties to test potential commitments or settlement terms before submitting a formal application. This approach would align India’s framework with established international practice, where early dialogue is integral to negotiated outcomes. For instance, the UK Competition and Markets Authority allows parties to engage with the case team during investigations to explore settlement possibilities without adverse inference; in the United States, the DOJ and the FTC conduct substantive settlement negotiations with parties during investigations; and within the European Union, parties may engage early with case officers of the European Commission to explore commitment decisions through structured dialogue.

Second, recalibrate the economic incentive: increasing the settlement discount, for instance, toward a 25% ceiling, could more proportionately reflect the strategic trade-offs involved, including the waiver of appeal rights and potential exposure to follow-on claims. A stronger economic incentive may help position negotiated resolution as a more commercially viable alternative to prolonged litigation.

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While the full conversation is available here, key themes from her address are available below:

• The AI Revolution: Efficiency vs. Accountability - The Chairperson highlighted that while AI offers transformative benefits in various sectors (for instance in healthcare, logistics, and education), it also introduces novel antitrust risks. She identified “algorithmic collusion” and “targeted price discrimination” as critical red flags, as highlighted in the CCI’s market study on AI. The Chairperson highlighted that the CCI’s goal is to better understand these opaque systems and ensure they remain accountable and transparent.

• Data as a Competitive Asset - Another important theme was on the CCI’s treatment of data. Reflecting on the 2021 WhatsApp privacy policy case, Mrs. Kaur emphasized that the CCI views data as a “non-price parameter for competition”, and that the CCI’s intervention proved its commitment to protecting users from coercive data collection practices that could reinforce market dominance.

• Redefining Dominance and Global Reach - The Chairperson clarified that measuring dominance in the digital age is a far more complex exercise than evaluating market shares. Under the Competition Act, the focus is on a company’s ability to act independently of market forces, evaluating aspects such as market structures, the impact of vertical integration and whether buyers have countervailing power.

• Protecting the Startup Ecosystem - Addressing the debate over European-style ex-ante (preventative) regulations, Mrs. Kaur advocated for a balanced approach. While such rules target massive “gatekeepers,” she cautioned against “overkill” that could burden India’s thriving startup and MSME sectors. For smaller players caught in the competition regulator’s cross-hairs, the CCI continues to favor “cease and desist” orders over heavy monetary penalties to encourage compliance without causing financial ruin.

• Strengthening the Institutional Core - Looking ahead, the CCI is shifting its focus toward building long-term institutional memory. Moving away from a reliance on short-term professionals, the CCI aims to induct specialized talent, which includes data scientists, economists, and tech analysts, to understand and address competition concerns in increasingly technical markets. The Chairperson highlighted significant updates to its regulatory toolkit, which includes revised cost of production regulations to curb predatory pricing and introducing deal value thresholds to catch killer acquisitions, signalling that the CCI is sufficiently empowered and ready to enforce competition law in an effective, proportionate manner.

The Chairperson’s remarks underscore the CCI’s keen awareness of its role in ensuring the Indian economy sees the benefits of balanced and competitive markets - whether in tech markets or otherwise. The CCI Chairperson’s perspective aligns closely with the Indian government’s ambition to drive domestic innovation and establish India as a leading voice in the global digital economy, particularly given its contribution to the ongoing discourse on AI governance and regulation at the India AI Summit 2026.

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This month saw the Competition Commission of India (CCI) finding a contravention of bid rigging and imposing a penalty for gun-jumping. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) also issued multiple decisions. In two cases, it upheld the CCI’s discretion to close inquiries under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act), as long as it has applied its mind to the material on record and issued a reasoned order. In two other cases, the NCLAT delved into the merits, upholding the CCI’s order in a bid rigging case, while in the other, it overturned the CCI’s finding of no contravention based on inconsistencies in the CCI’s approach on defining the relevant market during the inquiry.

We discuss these developments below.

1. The CCI finds KKK Mills and Sankeshwar Synthetics guilty of bid rigging but refrains from imposing monetary penalty (see here)

On 2 January 2026, the CCI passed an order finding M/s KKK Mills and M/s Sankeshwar Synthetics Pvt. Ltd. guilty of engaging in bid rigging in a public tender. The case was initiated based on a reference from the Master General of Ordnance Service.

The CCI’s preliminary order directing the investigation noted that identical pricing (down to two decimal points) across multiple tenders raised a strong suspicion of prior understanding rather than independent decision-making. The CCI’s inquiry revealed other evidence of collusion, such as simultaneity in submitting bids on two separate occasions, evidence of communication through a related entity, and deliberate deletion of emails to conceal evidence. Based on these “plus factors”, the CCI held that synchronised bidding, coupled with familial ties and evidence of information exchange, established a concert of action in violation of Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act.

The CCI’s contravention finding included individual liability for the companies’ office bearers. However, the CCI did not impose a monetary penalty in this case and only directed the parties to cease and desist from cartelization. The CCI considered mitigating factors such as: (a) the parties involved being MSMEs; (b) having a long history of supplying the armed forces without default; and (c) the potential economic impact of penalties on their solvency. The CCI noted that the primary purpose of the Competition Act, which is to rectify market distortions and regulate conduct, was achieved through the cease-and-desist direction.

2. Allcargo penalised for failure to notify a transaction resulting in a shift from joint to sole control (see here)

On 8 January 2026, the CCI penalised Allcargo Logistics Limited (Allcargo) for failing to notify a transaction involving its acquisition of the remaining 30% stake in Gati-Kintetsu Express Private Limited (Target), taking its shareholding from 70% to 100%.

Allcargo argued that the transaction was exempt under the intra-group acquisition exemption1 since it had always exercised “decisive” and “sole” control as the majority shareholder, and that there was no change in the “quality of control”. Allcargo also highlighted that the exiting shareholder, KWE, was merely a financial investor with no interest in management or governance.

However, the CCI disagreed. Aligning with its Combination FAQs, the CCI observed that control is a matter of degree and includes de jure negative control. It observed that regardless of how active KWE was in daily operations, it had veto rights over reserved matters and the right to block special resolutions through its 30% shareholding, which constituted control for the purposes of the Competition Act. As such, the transaction resulted in a transfer from joint to sole control, rendering the intra-group exemption inapplicable.

While Allcargo pleaded mitigating factors, including its bona fide intent and the initiation of a robust competition compliance program, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 50,00,000 (Rupees Five Million). The CCI’s decision aligns with its established approach, which involves a strict reading of the notification requirements and a broad interpretation of what constitutes “control” under the Competition Act.

3. The NCLAT upholds CCI’s closure of inquiries under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act

The NCLAT affirmed the CCI’s discretion to close proceedings under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act in two judgments, Singareni Collieries and Apaar Infratech. These rulings emphasise that the CCI is not duty-bound to hold oral hearings or seek further information at this preliminary stage before concluding whether or not a further inquiry is warranted.

A key point from Apaar Infratech is the NCLAT’s view on the CCI seeking information from the opposite party. The appellant noted that the CCI sought a response from the opposite party, but never received it. The NCLAT held that merely requesting information does not automatically indicate a prima facie case exists. Consequently, the CCI was justified in closing the matter based solely on the existing material on record, even without the opposite party’s reply. The CCI’s only obligations at the preliminary stage are to consider the material on record and issue a reasoned order.

4. The NCLAT upholds CCI’s bid rigging penalty, affirming use of circumstantial evidence (see here)

On 7 January 2026, the NCLAT affirmed a CCI order imposing a penalty for bid rigging in a public procurement case, reinforcing the validity of using circumstantial evidence.

The CCI’s finding against M/s Klassy Enterprises (Klassy) was based on several “plus factors,” including the use of a common IP address for three tender participants’ bids, Klassy’s payment of tender fees and Earnest Money Deposits (EMD) on behalf of the other bidders, and the subsequent refund of EMDs back to Klassy’s account. The CCI had imposed a penalty of INR 10 lakhs each on Klassy and the other bidders.

Klassy appealed, arguing that the common IP addresses and fee payments were explained by its public “tender filling” service at a cyber cafe. Klassy also claimed that it had reduced its bid price during negotiations (which a cartel member would not do), and that the price parallelism observed was due to the standardized nature of the product (sewing machines).

In its review of CCI cartel decisions, the NCLAT has consistently demanded that contravention findings be based on reliable, cogent, and well-investigated evidence, which can include circumstantial evidence. It has previously overturned CCI orders lacking sufficient or properly analysed evidence.2 In the Klassy case, the NCLAT highlighted the importance of circumstantial evidence in cartel cases, since direct evidence of a cartel is rare. It affirmed the CCI’s analysis that the evidence suggested collusion between the tender participants, and further, that they had not presented sufficient material to overturn the presumption of anti-competitive effect.

5. The NCLAT remands Chettinad Coal Terminal case to CCI based on inconsistencies in relevant market definition (see here)

On 21 January 2026, the NCLAT set aside a CCI order that had dismissed competition concerns against Chettinad International Coal Terminal Pvt. Ltd. (CICTPL), remanding the matter for fresh adjudication. The case centered on allegations by the Tamil Nadu Power Producers Association (TNPPA) that CICTPL exploited a lack of port alternatives to impose excessive tariffs and mandatory third-party “coordination” charges for coal terminalling services at the Kamarajar Port.

The core of the dispute involved whether the relevant geographic market was limited to Kamarajar Port or included the more distant Krishnapatnam Port (176 km away):

• Initial Order: The CCI directed the Director General (DG) to investigate based on a preliminary finding of dominance within a relevant market defined as the “provision of coal terminal services in and around Kamarajar Port“.

• DG’s investigation: In its investigation, the DG considered evidence such as common customers (including some power producers that were part of TNPPA) between Kamarajar port and the Krishnapatnam port and the latter’s significantly larger capacity, to support its conclusion that the two ports were viable substitutes to each other. With the relevant geographic market having expanded to include both ports, the DG found that CICTPL was not dominant, and consequently, there was no abuse of dominance.

• CCI directs supplementary investigation: TNPPA objected to the DG’s analysis, resulting in the CCI directing the DG to conduct a supplementary investigation. Notably, the CCI highlighted that the DG ought to have distinguished between coal traders and fixed-plant consumers (such as thermal power producers), which operate under different constraints.

• Supplementary DG investigation: The DG’s subsequent analysis evaluated the “captive” hinterland areas of both ports (i.e. fixed-plant customers), and noted limited overlap. The DG also noted that transportation costs were critical to power producers’ choice of coal-terminaling services. On this basis, the DG”s supplementary investigation report excluded the Krishnapatanam port from the relevant market - this led the DG to conclude that CICTPL was dominant and the mandatory imposition of third-party charges violated Section 4 of the Competition Act.

• CCI’s final order: In its final order, the CCI diverged from the DG’s supplementary analysis. The CCI rejected the DG’s “captive” hinterland approach noting that this led to the exclusion of about half of CICTPL’s demand; it also noted that the DG’s consumer survey indicated that at least half of the respondents source coal from both ports. On this basis, the CCI determined the relevant geographic market to include both Kamarajar port and the Krishnapatnam port. Within this wider geographic market, the CCI concluded that CICTPL was not dominant, and that the imposition of mandatory third-party charges were merely “opportunistic” behaviour that could not be penalised absent a finding of dominance.

Following an appeal by TNPPA, the NCLAT overturned the CCI’s decision, which involved a detailed review of the case’s merits. The NCLAT highlighted the CCI’s deviation from its own prima facie order and its failure to consider various aspects of the DG’s analysis in the supplementary investigation report. The NCLAT affirmed the narrower market definition based on the evidence, primarily driven by the nature of power producers as a distinct consumer group and the impact of transportation cost on their commercial decision making, and rejected the CCI’s analysis in the final order as erroneous. As a result, the NCLAT determined that CICTPL was dominant, and that the mandatory collection of charges by three Chettinad group entities constituted an abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

The NCLAT’s decision is unusual for the specificity of its directions. Despite having evaluated the merits in detail, the NCLAT did not simply set aside the CCI’s decision - it remanded the matter to the CCI for fresh consideration “in accordance with law”, directing that the parties be given the opportunity to be heard and present fresh evidence. The NCLAT has previously remanded matters to revisit the quantum of penalty imposed while agreeing with the CCI’s finding of contravention on merits, or to address procedural infirmities in the CCI’s handling of the case (e.g., final order issued by members who were not present during the hearing). In this case, the NCLAT’s decision to remand could possibly have been driven by the fact that the CCI expressed opposing views in the course of the inquiry.

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1. The division bench of the Kerala High Court upholds CCI’s jurisdiction in Jiostar abuse of dominance case (see here)

The Kerala High Court’s decision in Jiostar India Pvt. Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India revisits the long-running tension between sectoral regulation and competition law enforcement.

This writ appeal arises from an order of the Single Judge bench of the Kerala High Court dismissing a writ petition that had challenged the CCI’s order directing an investigation into Jiostar’s alleged abuse of dominance in the television broadcasting market in Kerala. The complainant, Asianet Digital Network Pvt. Ltd. (ADNPL), a leading multi-system operator (MSO), alleged that Jiostar and its group entities extended discriminatory discounts and preferential commercial terms to a rival distributor, Kerala Communicators Cable Ltd. (KCCL). These benefits, structured through marketing agreements and promotional payments, were alleged to contravene the discount caps under the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Interconnection Regulations, 2017, resulting in denial of market access, subscriber migration, and foreclosure, thereby also raising concerns under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act).

In appeal, Jiostar contested the CCI’s jurisdiction, arguing that the dispute fell squarely within the regulatory domain of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). Relying on CCI v. Bharti Airtel, it contended that jurisdictional and technical issues under sectoral regulations must first be determined by TRAI before the CCI could examine competition law implications, and that the investigation order, passed without hearing, caused serious commercial prejudice.

The Court noted that Bharti Airtel does not lay down a blanket rule barring CCI intervention wherever a sectoral regulator exists. Rather, the requirement of prior sectoral determination applies only in cases where the facts relate to a specific technical or involving technical incompatibilities or regulatory dependencies. In contrast, allegations of sham arrangements, preferential treatment, and market foreclosure can be independently examined by the CCI, with inter-regulatory coordination facilitated under the Competition Act.

In our 2025 year-end post, we noted that testing the CCI’s jurisdiction was a recurring theme, a trend set to continue in 2026. Appellate and constitutional courts are increasingly signalling that competition law can operate alongside sectoral regulations, aligning with the government’s proposed “whole-of-government” framework. While jurisdictional clarifications may slow enforcement in the near term, the focus on inter-regulatory engagement points to a shift toward coordinated, harmonised oversight across sectors.

Jiostar has approached the Supreme Court contesting the Kerala High Court’s decision. We will closely watch how the apex court addresses the matter and continue to track developments as the case unfolds.

2. NCLAT clarifies the scope of its decision in WhatsApp LLC and Meta Platforms’ appeals (see here)

In its order dated 18 November 2024 (CCI Order), the CCI imposed a five-year prohibition on data sharing for advertising purposes between WhatsApp and other Meta group companies. Alongside this restriction, WhatsApp and Meta were directed to adhere to mandatory transparency requirements and to provide users with an opt-out option for any data sharing undertaken for non-advertising purposes. The CCI Order further provided that, once the five-year period elapsed, these transparency and opt-out obligations would also extend to data sharing for advertising purposes.

Subsequently, the NCLAT, in its judgment dated 4 November 2025 (NCLAT Judgment), set aside the data sharing ban imposed under the CCI Order. However, the judgment inadvertently also set aside the mandate requiring compliance with the transparency and opt-out obligations.

This error was addressed through a subsequent clarification order (Clarification Order), which restores and clarifies the position. Under the Clarification Order, Meta and WhatsApp are required to comply with the transparency and opt-out obligations for both advertising and non-advertising purposes, within a period of three months, ending on 15 March 2026.

3. The CCI cautions Maharashtra liquor trade associations and issues a cease-and-desist direction in relation to cartel conduct (see here)

In an order dated 11 December 2025, the CCI held that three liquor trade associations, namely the Maharashtra Wine Merchants Association, the Pune District Wine Merchants Association, and the Association of Progressive Liquor Vendors1, had cartelized in contravention of the Competition Act.

The core issue was whether the associations transgressed their legitimate role of industry advocacy by actively dictating commercial terms to liquor manufacturers, thereby engaging in cartelization in violation of Section 3(3).

• The CCI’s investigation revealed that the associations systematically issued circulars, emails, and WhatsApp directives to their members, mandating specific retail margins, cash discounts, and credit periods. It rejected the argument that these were industry standards or recommendations, and found that these were enforced rules rather than voluntary guidelines. The CCI held that distinct retailers must independently determine their own commercial variables based on their individual business economics. By collectively fixing these cost components, the associations effectively determined the sale price of liquor products, resulting in indirect price-fixing, which contravened Section 3(3)(a).

• The CCI also noted that the associations mandated that new manufacturers must obtain “No Objection Certificates” (NOCs) and pay “Introduction Charges” or “Donations” to the association funds before launching new brands or schemes. Manufacturers who refused to comply faced threats of collective boycott. By controlling which products could enter the market based on the payment of arbitrary fees, the associations limited the supply of goods and restricted consumer choice, in clear violation of Section 3(3)(b), which prohibits agreements that limit or control production and supply.

Procedurally, this order raises a unique issue regarding the admissibility of video evidence. The informant sought confidentiality over its identity, which the CCI granted. The associations demanded access to the video evidence submitted by the informant through the confidentiality ring mechanism, to prepare their defense. This concern was compounded by the fact that the witness connected to the video declined to submit to cross-examination despite being afforded an opportunity. However, the CCI denied this request on the grounds that the video revealed the identity of the Informant. The CCI ruled in favour of protecting the informant’s identity, and held that excluding the video did not violate the principles of natural justice because the finding of contravention was sufficiently supported by other independent documentary evidence, such as minutes of meetings and correspondence.

Ultimately, the CCI issued a cease-and-desist order against the associations, and held certain office bearers personally liable under Section 48 of the Competition Act. However, it did not impose any penalty, on account of mitigating factors such as their first-time offender status, non-profit character, welfare activities for small retailers, and the prior discontinuation of the NOC practice. Although not cited, the CCI’s approach is in line with its Penalty Guidelines, issued in 2024.

4. The CCI dismisses case against Haryana Development Authorities (see here)

The CCI closed a case filed by real estate developers against the Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) and the Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP). The dispute arose from the levy of development charges without corresponding infrastructure delivery, with developers alleging that they were being made to pay without receiving timely development in return.

The information was filed by ILD Housing Projects Private Limited and the Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Association of India (CREDAI-NCR). They accused the DTCP and HSVP of abusing their dominant position in the market for development and infrastructure in Haryana. The developers challenged what they described as one-sided and unfair terms in Letters of Intent and Bilateral Agreements, including the obligation to pay interest on delayed payments while being denied any remedy for delays in infrastructure provision, and the lack of any scope to negotiate these terms.

The CCI, however, dismissed the allegations and closed the case. First, the CCI declined to visit the legality of External Development Charges (EDC) and Infrastructure Development Charges (IDC). Relying on the 2015 judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in M/s VPN Buildtech Pvt Ltd. vs State of Haryana, the CCI noted that the obligation to pay EDC exists independently of whether external development works have been completed, and that penal interest on delayed payments is valid irrespective of infrastructure status.

This stance is particularly noteworthy when viewed against the CCI’s earlier jurisprudence, where it has not hesitated to examine conduct for competition law violations even if such conduct is otherwise legally valid or statutorily sanctioned. In this instance, however, the CCI appeared to consciously exercise restraint, signalling a reluctance to allow competition law proceedings to become a parallel forum for reopening issues already conclusively determined by constitutional courts.

More importantly, the CCI held that the actions of the DTCP and HSVP were statutory in nature, not commercial. It clarified that the issuance of licenses and land acquisition are functions performed under law, and falls outside the scope of the Competition Act’s scrutiny.

In this edition of our newsletter, we look back on 2025 and highlight 4 key themes in competition law enforcement that could have significant implications for 2026 and years to come.

Theme 1 - Regulating digital markets: adjudication over regulation

Protecting competition in AI with “soft” law

The CCI’s AI market study was a clear win, showing a measured, innovation-supporting approach. It proposes a self-audit mechanism for transparency and accountability, reserving the right to attribute liability for AI misuse.

Revisit our blog post on the AI market study here.

The strategic pause with ex-ante digital markets regulation

Following the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report in August, India paused the Draft Digital Competition Bill (DCB) for more evidence-based study. This pause may be informed by the challenging implementation of Europe’s Digital Markets Act.

Axiom5’s analysis of the Standing Committee Report is here.

Meanwhile, the CCI continued ex-post case-by-case monitoring, upholding business justifications like platform security, delisting harmful apps (subject to inquiry), and setting defaults (with easy opt-out), suggesting that one-size-fits-all ex-ante rules may not suit Indian markets.

Capacity building - the need of the hour

The Standing Committee also noted the CCI’s limited funds and the need to enhance its technical expertise as key constraints. The CCI is addressing this through stakeholder engagement, a proposed AI Think Tank, and continuous collaboration with other government agencies such as the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology to improve regulatory coordination.

Key takeaways: On the AI front, the CCI will trust companies to self-assess and comply, but reserves the right to attribute liability to those who deploy, design, and profit from the misuse of AI. For tech companies, it is as important as ever to document commercially sound justifications for their business practices, while remaining mindful of the guardrails of competition law principles.

Theme 2 - Testing out the new regulatory toolkit

Settlements and Commitments

The CCI issued its first settlement order (Google Android TV) and is negotiating commitments in another case. This mechanism aims to resolve inquiries swiftly, correct market distortions (especially in digital markets), and rationalize regulatory resources, countering long litigation timelines.

The May 2025 edition of our newsletter covering the CCI’s settlement order is available here.

Key takeaway: With ongoing digital market cases, settlements and commitments offer companies a strategic tool to resolve inquiries and work with the CCI to implement corrective measures.

Exacting scrutiny through merger control

The CCI clarified its revamped merger control regime with non-binding guidance in May 2025, emphasising rigorous interpretation of the Deal Value Threshold, exemptions, overlap mapping, and the material influence threshold.

Axiom5’s detailed analysis of the Combination FAQs is here.

Enforcement was aggressive: Goldman Sachs was penalised for acquiring “information rights” (deemed strategic interest), Matrix Pharma for altering transaction structure post-approval, and Carlyle for non-disclosure of affiliate overlaps in a Green Channel filing.

Conversely, the CCI showed nuance by clearing the Bharat Forge / AAM India deal after a Phase II review, accepting “hold separate” commitments. A proactive approach to M&A scrutiny, particularly in digital markets, is expected in 2026.

Key takeaways: Investors and transacting parties must meticulously assess notification requirements, given the CCI’s proactive scrutiny. Strict interpretations of “control” and expanded “affiliate” definitions demand thorough due diligence. The CCI has shown that the risk of incurring penalties for flouting notification requirements is real.

Theme 3 - Substantive and procedural rigour from Appellate Courts

Appellate courts, including the Supreme Court and NCLAT, tested the CCI’s application of the Competition Act, reinforcing legal guardrails.

Mandating the “Effects Test”

The Supreme Court mandated the CCI to show actual or potential anti-competitive effects in abuse of dominance cases (Section 4) in Schott Glass, raising the evidentiary bar for the CCI.

NCLAT reins in digital markets remedies

In the Google Play and WhatsApp Privacy Policy cases, the NCLAT limited the CCI’s remedial power by applying proportionality. In Google Play, the NCLAT rejected forward-looking remedies akin to ex-ante rules and reduced the penalty by 75% using the “relevant turnover” principle. In WhatsApp, the NCLAT struck down the 5-year ban on data sharing between WhatsApp and Meta, while upholding the penalty and the CCI’s jurisdiction over data privacy as a competition issue, requiring future data sharing to include disclosure, opt-outs, and purpose-limitation.

Procedural safeguards through writ challenges

While not unusual, various High Courts have stepped in to safeguard parties’ procedural rights in CCI inquiries in 2025. The Delhi High Court (DHC) is set to hear challenges regarding procedural violations in dawn raids and DG depositions, halting underlying inquiries.1 Crucially, the DHC will hear Apple’s challenge2 to the constitutional validity of the CCI’s expanded power to compute penalties based on global turnover, which, following the 2024 Penalty Guidelines, poses a significant financial risk for global companies.

Key takeaways: The impact of appellate review that emphasises procedural safeguards will likely translate into more rigorous inquiries by the CCI. While this could lengthen inquiry timelines in the short term, it could result in more robust enforcement orders that better withstand appellate scrutiny, going forward.

Theme 4 - Testing the boundaries of CCI’s jurisdiction

Patents Act v. the Competition Act

The Supreme Court abstained from resolving the jurisdictional conflict between the Patents Act and the Competition Act in Ericsson, leaving the Delhi High Court’s 2023 ruling - that the Patents Act prevails over the Competition Act for the exercise of patent rights - in effect.

We analysed this jurisdictional tussle in our September blog post and considered the incentives for “strategic litigation” here.

Immediately after, the NCLAT observed in Vifor Pharma that the CCI lacked jurisdiction over a patented drug distribution issue, although this specific patent did not fall under the DHC’s “complete code” of Chapter XVI of the Patents Act. This offers the CCI a chance to seek the Supreme Court’s clarity on its jurisdiction for patent disputes not governed by compulsory licensing rules.

“Concurrent” jurisdiction with other sectoral regulators

In contrast, the Kerala High Court affirmed the CCI’s power to regulate competition issues in the telecom sector, and the NCLAT affirmed its “concurrent” jurisdiction over competition implications of data privacy (WhatsApp). This aligns with the government’s proposed “whole-of-government” framework for digital markets and AI, signalling a move towards harmonised regulation.

Key takeaways: As the regulatory framework evolves, the CCI and government must balance effective enforcement with minimising compliance burden. While jurisdictional boundaries are being settled and could mean another year of slow enforcement, inter-regulatory engagement signals a move towards harmonisation.

Prognosis for 2026: A more complex compliance landscape

The outlook for 2026 points toward an increasingly sophisticated compliance environment, shaped by evolving judicial interpretations and a demand for greater economic rigour. While appellate courts continue to monitor the CCI’s discretion in enforcement, the regulator has modernised its toolkit, demonstrating a growing capacity for nuanced analysis and rigorous, case-specific enforcement. For businesses, while substantive defences are becoming more viable, they are also facing heightened scrutiny (particularly in merger control). The year ahead requires vigilant engagement: understanding not just the letter of the law, but the CCI’s specific evidentiary demands and the strategic value of early intervention to pre-empt formal enforcement.

On the global stage, competition law is being redefined by a strategic shift in political economy. Emerging markets are increasingly moderating enforcement to shield domestic businesses from over-regulation, while simultaneously de-escalating tensions with the US to avoid punitive retaliatory measures. By pivoting away from aggressive regulatory intervention, regulators are prioritising long-term economic sovereignty and diplomatic stability over technical market corrections.

Ultimately, India is charting its own middle path by tempering regulatory vigilance with pro-growth and pro-innovation pragmatism. This signals a move towards a more nuanced strategy tailored to India’s unique national interests.

From the SC’s order permitting the withdrawal of Asian Paints’ challenge to a CCI probe, to the CCI’s closure of an MSME’s complaint against Google, and the NCLAT’s clarification on the interface between patent and competition law, this month underscored the maturing balance between statutory interpretation, regulatory discretion, and judicial oversight. The CCI also issued important clarifications on intra-group exemptions under the Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combination) Rules, 2024, while releasing its much-anticipated Market Study on Artificial Intelligence, signalling a shift toward cooperative and capacity-building approaches in emerging technology markets.

Here is a summary of the most critical developments this month.

Supreme Court Allows Withdrawal of Asian Paints’ Challenge to CCI Probe (See orders of the Bombay High Court and Supreme Court)

In October 2025, Asian Paints Limited (APL) withdrew its special leave petition (SLP) from the Supreme Court. This SLP challenged a Bombay High Court (BHC) judgment that had upheld the CCI’s decision to investigate allegations of abuse of dominance made by Grasim Industries’ (Grasim) paints division, Birla Opus.

The dispute arose when Grasim approached the CCI in December 2024, alleging that APL had engaged in exclusionary conduct—pressuring dealers not to stock Birla Opus products, restricting access to logistics and warehousing, and offering selective incentives to secure exclusivity. On 1 July 2025, the CCI directed its Director General (DG) to conduct an investigation.

APL challenged this order before the BHC, arguing that the complaint was substantially similar to a prior information filed by JSW Paints in 2019, which the CCI had investigated and dismissed in 2022. It contended that Section 26(2-A) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) barred re-inquiry into “the same or substantially the same facts and issues,” and that APL was denied a hearing before the CCI formed its prima facie opinion.

The BHC, in its judgment pronounced on 11 September 2025, dismissed APL’s petition. It held that the functions performed by the CCI under Section 26(1) (directing an investigation) are administrative and preparatory in nature, not judicial. Consequently, the BHC ruled that APL had no inherent right to a hearing at this prima facie stage of inquiry. The BHC also held that Section 26(2-A), inserted by the 2023 amendment, is a clarificatory and enabling provision intended to avoid duplication of effort. The BHC concluded that Section 26(2-A) neither creates a jurisdictional embargo on the CCI, nor does it obligate the CCI to record reasons for not closing a case when it decides to direct a prima facie investigation.

APL challenged this ruling before the SC. The SLP was taken up for hearing on 13 October 2025, before a bench comprising Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi. APL submitted that Grasim’s complaint mirrored the earlier JSW Paints case and pointed out that repeated probes threatened the company’s reputation. The SC, however, declined to intervene. After brief arguments, the petition was withdrawn, leaving the BHC ruling undisturbed.

For practitioners, the case provides the first judicial interpretation of Section 26(2-A) after its introduction through the 2023 amendment. The BHC’s reading affirms the CCI’s discretion to investigate successive complaints where circumstances evolve or new entrants allege fresh exclusionary conduct. The outcome underscores that while the amendment aims to prevent repetitive inquiries, it does not immunize enterprises from renewed scrutiny if there is a change in the facts or when market conditions or complainants change.

CCI closes MSME’s complaint against Google on developer account termination (See CCI’s order here.)

The CCI recently dismissed allegations of abuse of dominance against Google LLC (Google) made by Liberty Infospace Private Limited (Liberty Infospace / Informant). Liberty Infospace, an MSME developer of a human resource management application named EasyDo Tasks–HRMS Payroll AI, challenged Google’s termination of its developer account on the Play Store. The CCI closed the case under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, finding no prima facie violation of Section 4.

Liberty Infospace alleged that Google’s unilateral termination of its developer account was arbitrary and disproportionate. It claimed that the termination breached Clause 10.3 of the Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement (GPDDA), which required prior notice, and that Google’s reliance on automated enforcement and pre-formatted appeal processes denied it a fair hearing. The Informant argued that this conduct constituted denial of market access under Sections 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(b)(i)–(ii) of the Competition Act and deterred smaller developers from entering the market. It also alleged discriminatory treatment compared to EU developers, who benefit from enhanced redressal mechanisms under the Digital Services Act (DSA).

On being asked to clarify its global redressal framework by the CCI, Google argued that the issues mirrored those already addressed in the Google Play Case (Case No. 39 of 2018), where the CCI had upheld the fairness of its Play Store policies. Google maintained that the GPDDA and Google Play Developer Program Policies (GPDPP) are standard-form agreements applied uniformly and that Liberty Infospace’s account was terminated under its Relation Ban Policy, which prevents repeat violators from re-entering the ecosystem. It submitted that automated enforcement, supplemented by human review, was necessary for scale and consistency, and that differences in EU appeal processes resulted from statutory obligations under the DSA rather than discriminatory conduct.

Although the CCI agreed that Google held a dominant position in the “market for app stores for Android mobile operating systems in India” it did not find prima facie evidence of abuse under Section 4. The CCI held that Google’s termination and appeal processes, particularly the relational ban framework, were designed to ensure compliance and safeguard users, not to exclude developers arbitrarily. The CCI accepted Google’s rationale for limiting disclosure of specific evidence to prevent policy evasion and noted that Google had no commercial incentive to remove compliant developers, given that a larger app base benefits its ecosystem.

The CCI also noted that the GPDDA and GPDPP had been previously reviewed in the Google Play Case and found to be non-abusive. In this instance, the termination and appeal process aligned with Google’s global practices and combined automated checks with human oversight, which the CCI did not find unfair or discriminatory per se. It further considered the linkage between Liberty Infospace’s developer account and the “Malware Seed Account” a sufficient and proportionate ground for termination.

In conclusion, the CCI found the dispute to be an individual contractual grievance rather than a systemic practice capable of causing an appreciable adverse effect on competition. The case was accordingly closed under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, and interim relief under Section 33 was declined.

This order reinforces the CCI’s measured approach while considering cases involving digital platforms, particularly those involving alleged “unfair termination” of developer accounts. The decision distinguishes between commercial disputes arising from standard contractual enforcement and genuine competition concerns involving exclusionary or discriminatory conduct. While the CCI acknowledged the asymmetry between major platforms and small developers, it found no evidence of systemic foreclosure or exploitative behaviour by Google. The ruling underscores that platform governance decisions, when applied uniformly and supported by objective justification, do not by themselves constitute abuse of dominance.

NCLAT affirms primacy of Patents Act over Competition Act in pharma disputes (See order here)

The NCLAT has held that the CCI lacks jurisdiction to examine allegations of anti-competitive conduct relating to patented pharmaceutical products, ruling that such issues fall squarely within the scope of the Patents Act, 1970 (Patents Act). The judgment, delivered in Swapan Dey v. Competition Commission of India & Anr. (Competition Appeal (AT) No. 5 of 2023, decided on 30 October 2025), affirms that the Patents Act is the special legislation governing disputes over the exercise of patent rights.

The appeal arose from a complaint filed before the CCI by Mr. Swapan Dey, CEO of a hospital under the Pradhan Mantri National Dialysis Programme, alleging that Vifor International AG (Vifor), the patent holder of Ferric Carboxymaltose (FCM)—a drug used to treat iron deficiency anaemia—had abused its dominant position by restricting supply and maintaining high prices. The CCI had closed the matter under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, finding no prima facie case against Vifor.

On appeal, the NCLAT upheld the CCI’s decision and went further to hold that the CCI lacked jurisdiction altogether, observing that the Patents Act prevails over the Competition Act when the alleged abuse arises from the exercise of patent rights. Relying on the Delhi High Court’s decision in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. CCI and the SC’s order dated 2 September 2025, which upheld that view, the NCLAT concluded that matters concerning patented inventions—including licensing conditions and alleged market restrictions—must be adjudicated under the Patents Act.

The NCLAT noted that Section 3(5) of the Competition Act expressly preserves the right of patent holders to impose reasonable conditions necessary to protect their intellectual property. It further referred to Sections 83 and 84 of the Patents Act, which provide a detailed framework for addressing unreasonable licensing terms and grant of compulsory licences. Since the patent for FCM expired in October 2023, the NCLAT also found no continuing competition concern.

The NCLAT thus held that the CCI lacked the power to investigate or adjudicate claims relating to the use or licensing of patented inventions and dismissed the appeal.

CCI Clarifies Applicability of Rule 3 Exemption to Intra-Group Transfers Under Combination Exemption Rules (See order here)

The CCI has clarified the interpretation and scope of Rule 3 of the Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combination) Rules, 2024 (Exemption Rules), in the context of intra-group transactions. The clarification came in the Kedaara II Continuation Fund (Kedaara) order, which involved an intra-group transfer of minority shares in Lenskart Solutions Limited, within the Kedaara Group (Lenskart Transaction). The Acquirer also notified the proposed acquisition of shares of Care Health Insurance Limited (Care), held by Trishikhar Ventures LLP (Trishikhar) to Kedaara (Care Transaction) as a transaction inter-connected to the Lenskart Transaction.

The CCI examined whether Rule 3 of the Exemption Rules which exempts certain acquisitions of additional shares or voting rights by an acquirer or its group—applies to transactions that do not involve any incremental acquisition, but instead a transfer of existing shareholding within the same group. The Acquirer argued that a literal interpretation confined the Rule to instances involving acquisition of “additional” shareholding, excluding intra-group transfers where ownership percentages remain unchanged.

Rejecting this narrow interpretation, the CCI held that reading Rule 3 as applicable only to incremental acquisitions would be inconsistent with the purpose and scheme of the Act and the Exemption Rules. Instead, the CCI adopted a purposive interpretation, extending the benefit of Rule 3 to intra-group transfers that satisfy all other conditions—particularly where control, rights, and shareholding continuity remain unaffected.

Accordingly, the CCI concluded that both the Lenskart and Care transactions were eligible for exemption under Rule 3 of the Exemption Rules and therefore did not require notification under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act.

CCI publishes much awaited AI Market Study (Report released 6 October 2025)

The CCI has released its long-awaited Market Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Competition Law (Report), marking India’s first comprehensive review of AI’s implications for competition policy. The study reflects a measured and cooperative approach, favouring advocacy, self-regulation, and capacity building over immediate legislative intervention.

While echoing global concerns about concentration of AI infrastructure, algorithmic collusion, and data-driven market power, the CCI stops short of recommending new regulatory tools. Instead, it calls for voluntary self-audit mechanisms, enhanced transparency in algorithmic operations, and public investment in open-source and non-personal data infrastructure to level the playing field for smaller AI developers.

Notably, the Report situates India within the Asian school of “soft regulation”, aligning with jurisdictions such as Singapore and Japan that prioritise innovation and market monitoring before introducing prescriptive AI rules. The CCI also underscores the need for institutional readiness, signalling that it intends to build expertise and stakeholder dialogue before considering any ex-ante framework for AI markets.

In essence, the CCI’s Report is a statement of intent—regulation through persuasion, not prohibition. It indicates that the regulator’s immediate focus lies in developing understanding, guiding industry conduct, and encouraging compliance-led governance in AI-driven markets.

(Please find a link to our detailed analysis here.]

This appears to be a win for efficiency, allowing parties to resolve disputes and saving the CCI precious time and resources. But this seemingly sensible procedural tweak hides a perverse incentive. Far from reducing litigation, this new approach risks turning the CCI into a tactical tool for commercial negotiation, potentially leading to a flood of strategic complaints.

For years, the doctrine in Indian competition law was clear. Once an informant presented its case and the CCI launched a formal inquiry, the matter was no longer a private squabble. It became a proceeding in rem, i.e. a matter of public interest concerning the entire market. The CCI took over the dual role of investigator and adjudicator, with the original informant no longer a key player. Whether the informant reconciled with the defendant was irrelevant; the inquiry into potential market-wide harm would continue.

This made approaching the CCI a serious, almost irreversible step. An informant’s leverage was front-loaded: “Settle with us now, or we go to the CCI and the outcome will be out of both our hands.” The recent judicial shift fundamentally rewires this dynamic. It hands the informant a powerful “kill switch” to the entire inquiry.

The strategic advantage this creates is enormous. A formal CCI inquiry is a daunting prospect - it is expensive, time-consuming, and carries significant reputational risk for the company under investigation. Previously, an “opposite party”, once under investigation, had no choice but to see the process through. Now, at any stage of the lengthy and arduous inquiry, the informant can offer the company under investigation an exit ramp: agree to our terms, and we can make this all go away.

This transforms the very nature of an antitrust complaint. It is now a powerful tool to gain leverage in a commercial dispute. The incentive is no longer merely to win a case, but to initiate one to force a settlement. This could result in an increase in filings, with some firms launching complaints not with the primary goal of seeing a final CCI verdict, but of putting a rival under the pressure of an inquiry to extract better contractual terms, lower prices, or other commercial concessions.

The danger is twofold. First, it risks clogging the CCI’s dockets with cases that are essentially private commercial disputes masquerading as public competition issues. This diverts the CCI’s finite resources from tackling systemic, anti-competitive behaviour that truly harms the market and consumers. Second, it privatizes public justice. A genuine case of market abuse that harms numerous players could be settled and withdrawn for the benefit of the original informant alone, leaving the underlying anti-competitive conduct unchecked, to potentially harm others.

While promoting settlements is a laudable goal, it must not come at the cost of undermining the CCI’s public mandate. It also undercuts the newly introduced settlements and commitments mechanism, where the CCI stays in charge throughout, ensuring the public interest remains paramount. Now, companies under investigation have a strong incentive to sidestep the CCI altogether and move directly to bilaterally settle with informants.

The CCI can still use its own powers tactically, by taking up the matter suo motu, to dull the impact of this jurisdictional blow. However, the Supreme Court may not take a charitable view of such tactical behaviour by a regulator. So for now, this new path in India, born from a desire for efficiency, may lead to a far more congested and tactical litigation landscape. A procedural shortcut could risk leading us down a long and winding road, potentially weakening the very institution designed to keep our markets fair and competitive.

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Across jurisdictions, competition authorities are converging on a few key risks, even as their responses diverge. The CCI’s report sits comfortably in the middle of this global debate: cautious but prudent, preferring cooperation and advocacy over hard regulation.

Where the world agrees - the risks of AI

Competition agencies around the world are aligned on one thing - AI could amplify existing market power. The CCI’s findings echo this consensus, highlighting concerns around concentration, transparency, and the potential for AI to make anti-competitive conduct more effective.

The key competition law issues identified in AI markets globally1 include:

• Market concentration in AI infrastructure - A handful of global technology firms control access to essential AI inputs: data, computing power, and foundational models. Smaller players depend on these incumbents for infrastructure, deepening structural dependencies and making entry harder.

• AI enabling anti-competitive conduct - AI systems could make collusion easier and more efficient - through coordinated pricing algorithms, hub-and-spoke arrangements through a shared algorithm, or through autonomous systems that “learn” and promote collusive outcomes. On the unilateral conduct side, self-preferencing, exclusive partnerships, or tying arrangements could lock users deeper into AI ecosystems, entrenching incumbents and limiting choice.

• Strategic mergers under scrutiny - Globally, regulators are watching AI-related mergers closely, particularly where acquisitions might foreclose access to data, talent, or computing resources. The fear is that strategic consolidation could cement market dominance in a fast-evolving field.

• The transparency problem - The “black box” nature of AI complicates oversight. Detecting collusion or exclusionary conduct is harder when algorithms are self-learning and opaque. Regulators are calling for greater auditability and explainability to bridge this gap.

Notably, the CCI adds a distinctly Indian dimension to this conversation - that AI could enable more effective price discrimination or predatory pricing, harms that could hit vulnerable consumers hardest and erode trust in AI systems. This assertion appears to be based solely on stakeholder perceptions and secondary literature detailing AI’s capacity to execute such strategies.

Where approaches diverge - how to address these risks

While regulators agree on the risks, they differ significantly on the remedies. A clear divergence has emerged: some jurisdictions have moved ahead with bespoke regulatory regimes to govern AI systems, while others are taking a more cautious approach that focuses on enforcement under existing laws, supplemented by voluntary or non-binding measures.

Proactive risk-based AI regulation

The EU’s AI Act and Digital Markets Act (DMA) form the most structured response to regulating the AI sector. The AI Act classifies systems by risk level, imposing strict compliance obligations for “high-risk” applications. The DMA’s rules, meanwhile, targets only AI firms that qualify as “gatekeepers”.

The UK’s approach is more flexible but no less proactive. Through the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, its competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) can designate firms with “Strategic Market Status” and impose bespoke conduct rules. The CMA’s updated market study on AI models reflects both its enhanced understanding of AI’s complexities and the rapid evolution of the AI sector.

Measured moves: AI oversight without new rules

Other regulators have adopted a more cautious and incremental approach, favouring monitoring conduct in AI markets and using existing tools to address potential issues, alongside guidance and other voluntary frameworks.

• United States: Active enforcement remains the primary approach, with recent cases involving algorithmic collusion and investigations into major AI players like Microsoft, OpenAI, and NVIDIA.

• Asia: Some Asian regulators are experimenting with voluntary or non-binding approaches. Singapore has introduced an AI market toolkit and a voluntary certification framework to promote responsible AI use. Japan and South Korea are similarly using soft tools, like guidelines and monitoring mechanisms to understand market dynamics before introducing hard law. In Asia, the emphasis seems to be on fostering responsible AI adoption, encouraging innovation, and driving growth, rather than implementing interventionist measures at this stage.

India’s Approach: Cooperative Compliance

While major jurisdictions are experimenting with ex-ante frameworks to preempt AI-related harms, the CCI’s market study indicates a measured stance, focusing on cooperation, advocacy, and incremental capacity building. This approach is pragmatic and realistic - it recognises that India’s role in the global AI race is still emerging, and that premature regulation could stifle innovation before competitive dynamics have fully matured.

This is evident from the CCI’s action plan flowing from the Report, which mirrors the broader Asian preference for “soft” regulation:

• Self-audit and proactive compliance: The Report’s most tangible takeaway is its proposed self-audit framework for AI firms, urging companies to proactively assess their AI systems for competition law risks and calling for greater transparency, particularly where algorithms could influence market outcomes and consumer welfare.

• Building public infrastructure: The study suggests that government funding for open-source technologies and non-personal data repositories would help foster the growth of AI startups and smaller businesses. This is perhaps a recognition that India’s contribution to the global AI market might be more significant in the AI application layer, rather than in the foundational physical and digital infrastructure.

• Building regulatory capacity and advocacy: The market study echoes the recent calls for increased institutional capacity at the CCI - particularly to tackle digital markets. The Report indicates that the CCI will continue to engage with stakeholders, other sectoral regulators and international competition regulators.

The AI market study indicates the CCI’s alignment with the Indian government’s recognition of India’s growing AI capabilities and immense potential. From a competition standpoint, the regulatory approach appears to be focused on shaping incentives through increased stakeholder dialogue, rather than outright prohibitions. In this sense, the AI Market study serves as a statement of intent, not a regulatory blueprint. It signifies that the CCI intends to learn before legislating, by signalling expectations, establishing benchmarks, and developing expertise.

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Here is a summary of the most critical developments this month.

Supreme Court backs CCI in its decision against Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation (KFEF) (See order here)

The Supreme Court has delivered a significant ruling, clarifying the procedure for imposing penalties on individuals under the Competition Act, 2002 (Act). This decision came in a case involving the KFEF, where the CCI had imposed penalties on both the federation and its office-bearers for anti-competitive conduct.

A theatre owner accused the KFEF of orchestrating a boycott, pressuring distributors to cut ties, and restricting film screenings. The CCI launched an investigation, and its Director General’s (DG) 2015 report found KFEF in breach of the Act, pinpointing two office-bearers as key decision-makers. Following this, the CCI shared the report with all parties, requested their responses and financial details, and held an oral hearing. In September 2015, the CCI levied monetary penalties and mandated KFEF to implement behavioural and structural changes, including a two-year disassociation for the named office-bearers.

The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) affirmed KFEF’s contravention but overturned the penalties and directives against the individuals. COMPAT’s reasoning? The absence of separate show-cause or penalty notices for the office-bearers. This led the CCI to challenge COMPAT’s decision before the Supreme Court.

The heart of the appeal revolved around a crucial procedural point: are separate notices essential for imposing individual liability and penalties, or is the existing statutory process, forwarding the DG’s report and allowing a chance to respond, sufficient?

The Supreme Court sided with the CCI, asserting that the Act envisions a “rolled-up” hearing. This means parties address both the findings of contravention and potential sanctions in a single proceeding, after the DG’s report is submitted. The Court found the CCI’s notice to be perfectly adequate: it clearly identified the individuals, detailed the alleged contraventions, requested financial information, and scheduled a hearing by notifying the identified parties. This, the Court concluded, fully satisfied the principles of natural justice.

The Supreme Court’s ruling makes clear that the CCI’s process can validly combine findings on contravention and penalty within a single hearing. Once the DG’s report identifies the individuals involved, the forwarding of that report - along with a reasoned notice inviting responses and financial details - is sufficient to meet the requirements of natural justice. Section 48 of the Act, the Court emphasised, creates a statutory basis for personal liability where individuals are shown to have directed or participated in the contravention, and separate penalty notices are not mandated so long as the CCI’s initial notice is comprehensive. The Supreme Court also notes that the presence of an appellate framework ensures the review of proportionality.

For practitioners, the judgment affirms that a distinct penalty show-cause is not necessary, provided the hearing process is robust and individuals are clearly informed.

The Supreme Court Declines CCI’s Plea in Ericsson-Monsanto Patent Antitrust Case (See order here)

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a petition filed by the CCI challenging a Delhi High Court judgment that had quashed its investigations into Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson and Monsanto Holdings Pvt Ltd. A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Sandeep Mehta dismissed the Special Leave Petition (SLP), while leaving the underlying legal questions open for determination in a more appropriate case.

The case arose from CCI’s investigations into allegations that Ericsson and Monsanto had abused their positions of dominance by imposing unfair and discriminatory licensing terms for their standard essential patents (SEPs), potentially violating Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. However, the Delhi High Court quashed the proceedings, ruling that the CCI lacked jurisdiction to pursue the matter once a settlement had been reached between the parties.

This outcome leaves one of the most significant jurisdictional questions in Indian competition law unresolved – whether the CCI can examine allegations of abuse of dominance in the context of patent licensing disputes that are also governed by the Patents Act. By declining to interfere and leaving the issue open, the Supreme Court has effectively maintained the status quo, keeping SEP-related licensing disputes largely within the domain of civil courts and patent authorities.

As Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), and connected-device technologies increasingly rely on standardised and cross-licensed patents, the intersection between competition and intellectual-property regulation will likely re-emerge – demanding eventual judicial or legislative clarity on how these regimes should coexist.

A detailed analysis of this case, as published on our blog, is available here.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) upholds CCI’s decision in an appeal filed by Beach Mineral Producers Association (See order here)

In a recent ruling, the NCLAT upheld the CCI’s decision to close a case involving the export of Beach Sand Minerals (BSMs). The appeal, filed by the Beach Mineral Producers Association, challenged a 2018 government notification that designated Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) as the sole canalising agency for BSM exports. The NCLAT held that the issue related to a government policy decision and therefore fell outside the scope of the Act.

The informants had alleged that IREL’s designation as the exclusive State Trading Enterprise (STE) for exporting minerals like ilmenite, rutile, and monazite constituted an abuse of dominance.

However, both the CCI and NCLAT held that the matter involved government regulation of strategic minerals - classified under atomic energy and defence laws - and thus fell within the scope of sovereign functions. As such, competition law did not apply, and any challenge to the policy must be pursued through appropriate legal or constitutional channels, not under the Act.

The ruling reinforces a crucial boundary between market conduct and policy formulation. When the conduct in question is a consequence of regulatory compulsion or a sovereign decision, the appropriate remedy lies in constitutional or administrative review, not in competition proceedings.

CCI Closes Abuse of Dominance Case Against GMR Hyderabad Airport (See order here)

The CCI has dismissed allegations of abuse of dominance against GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited (GMR), effectively closing a case filed by Air Works India (Engineering) Private Limited (Air Works). Air Works had accused GMR of denying market access by refusing to renew its license for space used to provide Line Maintenance Services (LMS) at Rajiv Gandhi International Airport (RGIA), allegedly to benefit GMR’s own subsidiary.

In its order, the CCI concurred with the DG’s market definition, identifying GMR as dominant in the upstream market of providing airport access at RGIA, while the downstream market was defined as the provision of LMS. However, the CCI ultimately disagreed with the DG’s initial finding of contravention and found no abuse of dominance. It held that: (i) Air Works continued to offer LMS using mobile units and airport passes, showing that dedicated space was not essential; (ii) GMR’s refusal to renew the lease was justified by the need for airport expansion; and (iii) there was no evidence of preferential treatment toward GMR’s subsidiary. GMR had, in fact, reallocated space from its subsidiary to British Airways.

The CCI concluded that the available evidence did not support the allegation of denial of market access. Accordingly, the case was closed with no finding of contravention under the Act.

The CCI’s order underscores its pragmatic approach to assessing “denial of market access” as a type of abuse of dominant position. Even where dominance is established, a refusal to deal or renew access will not amount to abuse if it is objectively justified and does not foreclose competition. By noting that Air Works could continue offering services through alternative means and that GMR’s actions were driven by legitimate expansion needs, the CCI reaffirmed that commercial discretion and operational necessity can be valid defences to alleged exclusionary conduct.

The decision signals a more evidence-driven and context-specific assessment of dominance cases in infrastructure markets – one that distinguishes between genuine expansion or reallocation and anti-competitive foreclosure, while emphasizing the importance of proportionality and objective justification.

The CCI green signals a probe into Virtual Print Fees (VPF) against PVR INOX (See order here)

The CCI has launched an investigation into PVR INOX Limited (PVR), the country’s largest multiplex chain, over alleged unfair practices related to VPF. The move follows a complaint filed by the Film and Television Producers’ Guild of India (Informant).

VPF is a fee that producers or distributors pay to cover the cost of digital projection equipment, introduced to support the transition from analogue to digital cinema. While intended as a temporary measure, the Informant argues that the fee has overstayed its purpose and is now being used in ways that restrict competition.

The complaint was brought up against three companies: UFO Moviez India Limited (UFO) and Qube Cinema Technologies Private Limited (Qube), both providers of digital cinema equipment, and PVR INOX.

While the CCI has chosen not to pursue action against UFO and Qube, citing a previously addressed case on similar issues, it has taken a closer interest in the conduct of PVR INOX. Citing the company’s substantial market share, both in terms of screen count and revenue, the CCI observed that PVR appears to hold a dominant position. Further, it found a prima facie case of abuse of dominance concerning the continued imposition of the VPF, denial of market access, and discriminatory practices.

The order reflects the CCI’s continued interest in understanding how long-standing commercial arrangements in the film exhibition sector operate in practice and discerning anti-competitive conduct in this industry.

CCI dismissed allegations against ICICI Securities and others concerning the authorised person agreement. (See order here)

The CCI recently dismissed a case concerning ICICI Securities Limited (ICICI), the National Stock Exchange (NSE), and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), related to ICICI’s termination of Authorised Person (AP) agreements. The informant, who was an AP of ICICI Securities, claimed that the broker, in collaboration with NSE and BSE, had engaged in anti-competitive conduct by invoking a “termination without cause” clause included in the standardised AP agreement.

The informant made several allegations against ICICI, NSE, and BSE regarding the AP Agreement:

• NSE and BSE engaged in cartel conduct by enforcing identical, non-negotiable AP agreements, thereby restricting the bargaining power of APs and hindering competition.

• ICICI imposed vertical restraints, such as refusal to deal (as APs were unable to retain or serve clients after termination), tie-in arrangements across exchanges, and exclusive distribution obligations.

• ICICI abused its dominant position by enforcing unfair terms, terminating agreements without cause, retaining clients and associated revenue without compensation, and effectively denying market access. The informant also noted that due to regulatory dependence on brokers, termination results in loss of income, goodwill, and business continuity for APs.

However, the CCI found no prima facie case, noting that the standard AP Agreement, including the termination clause, was based on a SEBI-mandated framework aimed at ensuring regulatory consistency and investor protection. As such, the actions of NSE and BSE were not found to violate the Act.

The CCI further observed that ICICI and its APs function within a principal-agent relationship under a regulated framework, and thus, the use of standardised AP Agreements was not viewed as anti-competitive. Moreover, given ICICI’s lack of market power and the existence of several credible competitors, such as HDFC Securities, Kotak Securities, and SBI Securities, providing competitive constraints in the market for “securities broking services rendered through APs in India,” there was no case of anti-competitive vertical restraints or abuse of dominance.

This case also highlights the CCI’s pragmatic approach in sectors where specific regulatory frameworks exist. The CCI acknowledged that the actions under scrutiny were conducted within a framework mandated by SEBI, and thus, any competition-related evaluation must also factor in the intent and oversight embedded in such sector-specific regulation.

For decades, the “invisible hand” of the market has been the accepted rule to determine success. But as economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued, even the most entrenched market structures are eventually dismantled by a “perennial gale” of innovation resulting in “creative destruction”, clearing the way for new market players.

For years, it seemed that in markets with strong network effects, success could be permanent, dashing any hope of Schumpeterian disruption. But not all regulators and judges share this outlook.

A Glimmer of Hope in a US Courtroom

A recent decision from a US court suggests the winds of change may be upon us. On 2 September 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Amit Mehta delivered a landmark remedies decision after finding Google guilty of anti-competitive practices in online web search services.

Judge Mehta’s ruling is built on hope - that a moment of Schumpeterian destruction has finally arrived, ready to reset a long-standing economic order. Crucially, he resisted popular calls to dismantle the company, a move that would have echoed the historic 1984 breakup of AT&T’s monopoly. Instead, Judge Mehta made a striking assertion: “the emergence of generative AI has changed the course of this case”. He pointed out that AI companies are now “better placed to compete... than any... developer has been in decades”.

The AI Paradox for Regulators

This isn’t just a casual observation; it signals a critical shift for regulators worldwide who are dealing with anti-competitive allegations against technology companies. The rise of generative AI has unleashed a new wave of potential players. This technological evolution must now be a central factor in both antitrust assessments and the remedies designed to address market dominance.

However, this new landscape presents a significant complication. While new AI startups are gaining ground, it’s also the case that the very tech incumbents under regulatory scrutiny are the ones funding and driving much of this innovation. In short, the disruptors and the disrupted are often one and the same.

This duality creates a complex puzzle for regulators. On one hand, generative AI could introduce new competition and disrupt long-standing market positions. On the other, it could simply reinforce the power of players who are already best positioned to develop, deploy, and scale these new technologies.

India at a Crossroads

As this global debate intensifies, all eyes are turning to India. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is preparing to publish a comprehensive market study report on AI. This study will likely explore how AI is impacting competition across various sectors and identify potential risks or regulatory blind spots.

The key questions now are - will the CCI acknowledge the dual role of technology leaders as both dominant forces and key innovators? Will it see generative AI as a catalyst for competition or as a new threat to market concentration? Most importantly, what enforcement tools and policy frameworks will it prioritise in response?

India is at a pivotal moment. The CCI’s decisions will not only shape the future of AI governance in the country but could also set a powerful precedent for other regulators navigating this new and challenging terrain. As the world enters an era of AI-fuelled disruption, striking the right balance between fostering innovation and preserving competition is more critical - and more difficult - than ever before.

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This post looks at both issues. Part I considers the limits of the CCI’s jurisdiction in SEP disputes. Part II explores the role of private settlements in ending competition proceedings. Before we dive in, the infographic below traces the course of the Ericsson litigation through the courts.

Part I: Can the CCI Enter the IP Battlefield? Lessons from the Ericsson Judgment

When Ericsson’s licensing practices were first challenged before the CCI in 2013, the dispute triggered one of the most sensitive questions in Indian regulatory law:

Can the CCI examine allegations of abuse in FRAND licensing of patents, or are such issues reserved for intellectual property (IP) law and the courts?"

Back in March 2016, Ericsson argued before the Delhi High Court that the Patents Act was a complete code governing royalties and licensing terms. The Delhi High Court did not fully oust the CCI, but it did restrain the Director General (DG) from submitting any final investigation report and directed the CCI not to pass a final order until further hearings. In effect, while the DG could continue fact-finding, the investigation was placed under judicial supervision.

In July 2023, the Division Bench of the High Court went further, holding that the CCI lacked jurisdiction altogether. The judgment was decisive: once the informant and Ericsson had reached a settlement, the “substratum” of the CCI’s case had vanished, and in any event the CCI could not pursue such investigations.

In September 2025, the Supreme Court declined to interfere. While carefully leaving questions of law open for a future matter, it effectively let the High Court’s 2023 decision stand.

Implications

• Scrutiny of SEPs has narrowed: The ruling limits the CCI’s ability to review licensing markets for SEPs, even in cases alleging excessive royalties or unfair terms. For SEP-heavy sectors such as telecom, semiconductors, and emerging AI standards, this translates into reduced antitrust exposure.

• Overlapping regimes remain sensitive: The decision signals judicial caution in areas where patent and competition law intersect.

Part II: Settlements and the Future of Competition Enforcement

The Ericsson case also raised a second issue:

What happens when parties settle while a CCI case is pending?

The Delhi High Court was clear - once Ericsson and the informant resolved their dispute privately, the foundation of the CCI’s case collapsed. The Supreme Court agreed: if the original complainants “have nothing further to say”, then proceedings cannot continue in the abstract.

On its own, this might have been seen as specific to SEP licensing. But the JCB case shows the principle is broader.

The JCB Connection

The CCI first initiated an investigation into allegations that JCB used predatory litigation to sideline its competitor, Bull Machines. After directing a DG probe, the parties privately settled before the case could run its course. In the litigation that followed, the Delhi High Court held that the settlement extinguished the substratum of the dispute, leaving nothing for adjudication, and stressed the sanctity of settlements, warning that keeping proceedings alive after resolution would leave firms under a perpetual “Sword of Damocles.” On appeal, the Supreme Court did not interfere with this order.

Taken together, Ericsson and JCB establish a judicial doctrine: private settlements in disputes with an IP or litigation component can effectively displace public competition enforcement.

The Implications

• Private settlements now carry decisive weight: Once parties resolve their disputes, CCI cannot keep investigations alive. This priorities business certainty but limits regulator oversight.

• Tension with India’s formal settlement framework: The Competition Act now allows for regulated settlements under the CCI’s watch, with penalty concessions. But these judgments suggest that private, out-of-court settlements may bypass even those formal processes, raising questions about consistency and oversight.

• Deterrence could weaken: Large firms might strategically settle with informants to stave off broader scrutiny.

On the other hand, the judgments reflect judicial pragmatism. Courts are reluctant to prolong regulatory proceedings once commercial disputes have been resolved.

Closing Thoughts

The Ericsson saga highlights the fault lines at the IP - competition interface. By narrowing the CCI’s jurisdiction and tying proceedings to private settlements, the courts have redrawn the boundaries of antitrust enforcement in India.

Whether these boundaries become permanent, or are redrawn again by Parliament, the CCI, or future judicial decisions, will shape how competition law interacts with patents in the years ahead.

Together, these decisions highlight the evolving priorities of Indian competition law - from dismissing repetitive cases to extending scrutiny across both public and private enterprises:

• Section 26(2A) in practice: The CCI appears increasingly inclined to invoke Section 26(2A) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act), which allows the dismissal of complaints that are repetitive, previously adjudicated, or based on settled issues.

• Public sector scrutiny: In a significant move, the CCI reiterated that public sector undertakings, such as Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited (RCFL), are not immune from antitrust scrutiny when they engage in commercial activity.

• Jurisdictional boundaries clarified: Several orders this month reflected the CCI’s firm stance on not entertaining matters that lie outside its jurisdiction. The CCI emphasized that commercial disputes, breaches of contract, or regulatory compliance issues cannot be recast as competition law violations unless there is clear evidence of anti-competitive behavior.

• Digital markets consolidation: In the digital economy, the CCI is showing a preference for consolidating overlapping complaints, particularly in complex areas like adtech and platform services, rather than launching multiple fragmented inquiries.

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Google: repeat challenge to search ad policies dismissed (order available here)

In a significant order, the CCI dismissed a complaint against Google by invoking Section 26(2A) of the Competition Act, which allows the CCI to close cases at the threshold where the issues have already been addressed in earlier proceedings.

Allegations: The case, filed by the Alliance of Digital India Foundation (ADIF), alleged abuse of dominance in the online search advertising market through four practices:

• Prohibiting third-party technical support providers from advertising;

• Restricting “Call Ads” to mobile devices;

• Using opaque ad ranking algorithms; and

• Allowing bidding on advertisers’ registered trademarks as keywords.

Assessment: The CCI observed that substantially the same facts and issues had already been decided by the CCI in its previous orders in Matrimony and Vishal Gupta. In those cases, the CCI had found that:

• Google's policies were based on defined criteria to ensure consumer safety and were non-discriminatory.

• Google provides sufficient data to advertisers regarding the performance of their ads.

• Google’s keyword bidding policy was pro-competitive as it increased the relevance of ads and enhanced user choice.

Applying Section 26(2A), the CCI declined to re-litigate settled issues, noting that principles of res judicata promote fairness, consistency, and efficiency.

In a related development, the Bombay High Court, while dealing with a writ petition concerning Asian Paints, clarified the scope of Section 26(2A). It held that the provision does not create a jurisdictional bar but is an enabling tool: the CCI may still examine fresh complaints if they rest on distinct facts or new evidence. The decision to apply Section 26(2A) remains a matter of CCI discretion.

CCI orders investigation into RCFL for alleged tying of Urea (order available here)

The CCI has ordered an investigation into RCFL, a government-owned navratna company, for allegedly tying the sale of other agricultural products with subsidised urea in Maharashtra. The informant claimed that farmers and dealers were compelled to buy non-subsidised goods bundled with urea, thereby exploiting the state-backed subsidy scheme. Evidence included press reports, official warnings, and affidavits from farmers and dealers.

Before addressing the allegations, the CCI confirmed that RCFL qualifies as an “enterprise” under the Competition Act. Relying on guidance from the Supreme Court (in Coal India Limited) and the Delhi High Court (in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India), the CCI deemed RCFL’s manufacturing and sales activities commercial and were subject to competition law, unlike sovereign functions which are exempt.

The relevant market was defined as the sale and supply of urea in Maharashtra, where RCFL has maintained a stable 40%+ market share for three years in a highly concentrated market with high farmer dependence. On this basis, the CCI formed a prima facie view that RCFL is dominant.

Alleged abuses included tie-in arrangements, unfair conditions, supplementary obligations, and leveraging dominance to promote other products (Sections 3 and 4). The CCI rejected the denial of market access claim, observing that it concerned secondary products rather than the urea market itself. This reflects a pattern of the CCI treating denial of access claims narrowly, limiting them to the dominant market itself rather than to related markets.

The matter has been referred to the Director General for investigation.

Real estate: Emaar holds no dominance in Gurugram villa development (order available here)

A complaint alleged that Emaar India Limited misled villa buyers by later permitting builder-floor developments within the same project. The CCI defined the market as the “development and sale of villas in Gurugram,” noting that villas differ from apartments in consumer preferences and price levels.

Reviewing licensing data, the CCI observed the presence of major developers including DLF, Godrej, and Tata Housing in the relevant market. Emaar did not hold a dominant position, and without dominance, the abuse claims could not be sustained. Allegations of vertical restraints were also unsupported. The matter was accordingly closed.

Inter-se vendor disputes: outside the scope of the Competition Act (order available here)

A retired army officer alleged that a rival juice vendor at Command Hospital, Kolkata, engaged in unfair competition, including below-cost pricing and operating without licenses.

The CCI emphasised that the Competition Act requires either an anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominance. Neither was present. Pricing by a small vendor did not raise competition concerns, while licensing and hygiene issues fall within the jurisdiction of other authorities. The complaint was dismissed.

Industrial software: AVEVA not dominant (order available here)

A complaint against AVEVA Group alleged tying of its MES, SCADA, and Historian software into bundled subscriptions. While these products are functionally non-substitutable, the CCI defined the relevant market as “market for MES, SCADA and Historian industrial automation software in India” treating them as part of a broader, interconnected ecosystem. This shows the CCI is increasingly looking at how product suites shape competition, not just whether they are interchangeable.

The CCI observed that the market remained competitive, with major players such as Siemens, Rockwell, SAP, Honeywell, and Emerson. AVEVA was not found to be dominant, and the tying allegations could not be upheld.

Adtech: new complaint against Google clubbed (order available here)

ADIF also filed a complaint concerning Google’s conduct in online display advertising. Allegations included tying its ad server with its ad exchange, restricting YouTube inventory to its own DSP, and self-preferencing through allocation practices.

The CCI noted that these issues overlapped with those already under investigation in the 'Publishers Case’ (Case Nos. 41 of 2021, 10 of 2022, 36 of 2022, and 34 of 2024). Exercising its powers under Section 26(1), the CCI consolidated ADIF’s complaint with the ongoing matter to ensure a comprehensive investigation. The move reflects the CCI’s preference for consolidating overlapping complaints into a single, comprehensive inquiry.

This isn’t a retreat, but a vital pause to re-vamp the DCB and strengthen the Competition Commission of India (CCI), learning from the complex experiences of other jurisdictions such as the EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK's Digital Markets, Consumers and Competition Act (DMCC).

Why the Rethink? The DCB’s Initial Design Flaws

The criticisms of the DCB largely coalesce around three key areas that undermined its proposed effectiveness and fairness:

1. The Evidentiary Blind Spot. A primary concern raised by stakeholders was the lack of a robust evidentiary basis for the DCB. There were no actual market studies to support either the market practices it sought to curb or the quantitative thresholds used to identify firms for regulation. This stood in stark contrast to the extensive studies and impact assessments undertaken by the EU, UK, Australia and Japan when formulating their digital market rules.

While many Indian digital businesses rely on platforms for rapid growth, benefiting from practices that the DCB might prohibit, smaller businesses simultaneously expressed concerns about “gatekeeper” firms entrenching market power, particularly in e-commerce. The good news is that both the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and CCI are now conducting market studies, aiming to thoroughly weigh the costs and benefits of ex-ante digital market rules - a crucial step to build credibility and buy-in for such a far-reaching framework.

2. Overly Broad and Vague Definitions. The DCB’s definitional ambiguities created significant uncertainty regarding the scope of digital services it would regulate and the companies that would fall within its ambit.

• Designation thresholds - Stakeholders expressed concern that the proposed low quantitative thresholds for designating firms as “systemically significant digital enterprises” (SSDEs) would hinder fast-growing Indian digital firms. The consensus is to revise these thresholds to only include truly “systemically significant” firms, supporting domestic players.

• Identifying Core Digital Services - The initial list of nine Core Digital Services (CDSs) in the DCB was problematic due to its inclusion of sectors that are relatively competitive and an overly broad definition of “online intermediation.” The Standing Committee recommends a more targeted, evidence-based DCB, excluding fast-growing domestic firms and potentially including “virtual assistants.”

• Associate Digital Enterprises - The DCB's conduct requirements extended to “Associate Digital Enterprises” (ADEs), broadly defined by “indirect involvement” in providing a CDS. This expansive definition was criticised for its lack of clarity, potential over-regulation, strain on regulatory resources, and negative impact on innovation.

3. The Missing Rebuttal and Exemption Mechanisms. A significant procedural omission in the DCB was the absence of a rebuttal mechanism. Unlike the EU’s DMA, which allows firms meeting quantitative thresholds to demonstrate that they do not, in fact, have a significant impact on the market, serve as an important gateway, or hold an entrenched position, the DCB offered no such facility. This was a key concern, as it meant firms that might not truly possess “systemic significance” could still be designated as gatekeepers.

The DCB also lacked a mechanism for designated entities to claim exceptions or limitations to conduct requirements after designation. The DMA, for instance, allows for suspensions or exemptions in circumstances such as threats to economic viability or public health and safety. While the DCB requires the CCI to consider factors like economic viability, cybersecurity, and fraud prevention when formulating conduct requirements, it crucially lacked a mechanism for designated enterprises to present evidence to support these “exceptions” before obligations were imposed. Facilitating greater engagement with digital enterprises is vital for a targeted, context-specific implementation, avoiding blanket prohibitions.

Global Lessons and India’s Forward Path

The global experience with ex-ante digital competition regulations has been varied, offering valuable insights for India.

The EU's DMA is actively designating gatekeepers, issuing penalties for non-compliance, and conducting its first public review of the DMA, even exploring its implications for the AI sector.

The UK’s DMCC is proceeding at a more measured pace, requiring market studies and consultations before interventions, and is in the process of designating Google and Apple for “strategic market status” (SMS) in key markets. Meanwhile, Japan has proposed targeted ex-ante regulations for mobile ecosystems, due to come into effect in December 2025. However, South Korea’s proposal has faced significant pushback from the US amid bilateral trade negotiations - echoing concerns that US tech companies are being unfairly targeted. This emphasises the growing perception of digital regulation as an aspect of foreign policy and geopolitical alignment, rather than solely an issue of domestic policymaking.

Alongside these ex-ante efforts, “traditional” antitrust routes continue to be pursued by the EU and the US, with the EU handing Google a penalty in its ad-tech investigation and the US District Court ruling that restricts Google’s search business practices. The CCI also has several on-going investigations involving digital markets.1

The message for India is clear: the DCB, in its current form, is very unlikely to be enacted. Both the MCA and CCI have reportedly gone back to the drawing board, with comprehensive market studies and discussions with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY). They are also considering the introduction of consultative mechanisms to safeguard against overregulation in specific sectors.

This renewed emphasis on transparency, clarity, checks and balances, and technical expertise is a promising sign. It suggests the DCB will be re-cast in a more pragmatic, evidence-based, and India-specific manner, carefully building on global experiences while fostering, rather than hindering, domestic digital innovation. The aim is to create a balanced law that addresses anti-competitive risks without stifling an important segment of the Indian economy.

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In this example, we illustrate how the structure of the AI stack directly shapes the business realities of a startup—from costs and dependencies to long-term sustainability. Each layer offers opportunities, but also creates points of control.

Infrastructure: The Cost of Survival

At the base of the AI stack lies infrastructure - the hardware and cloud services that provide computing power. Training or fine-tuning models demands powerful GPUs, supplied by a small number of hyperscale providers. For any founder, this layer largely determines survival costs before innovation can even reach the market.

Foundation Models: Leasing the Core Intelligence

The next layer is the foundation model, the large-scale language or vision model that provides the “intelligence” of an AI product. Building one from scratch is out of reach for most startups, as it requires enormous investments in data, chips, and expertise. Instead, companies typically license models from established providers. But providers can control permissible use cases, and they set the pricing. In effect, startups are renting the very core of their product rather than owning it.

Fine-Tuning and Middleware: Innovation Shaped by Lock-In

For our AI tutor to serve classrooms effectively, it needs careful fine-tuning for local curricula and languages such as Hindi, Tamil, and Bengali. This is often done through fine-tuning APIs offered by model providers. But vertical integration can create challenges. A startup that chooses a specific cloud service provider for its infrastructure may find that the provider’s integrated AI models are more convenient to use. Accessing rival models or independent alternatives could then become harder. Innovation at this stage is shaped not only by product needs but also by the architecture of specific ecosystems.

Applications: The Fragile Tip of the Stack

At the top of the stack lies the application layer - the AI tutor itself, the product that reaches parents and students. This is where many ecosystems thrive, with a vibrant range of startups in edtech, healthtech, and fintech. Building the application layer presents unique challenges, as its success is linked to several external factors.

A Global Debate on Control and Contestability

These dynamics are not unique to one country. Around the world, regulators are grappling with questions of concentration and control within the AI stack. For example, the European Union’s AI Act introduces detailed requirements for high-risk systems, and in the United States, agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice are probing the market power of cloud and AI providers.

India’s Competition Commission is also expected to publish an AI market study soon, examining similar questions of dependency and contestability. This provides an opportunity to learn from global debates while tailoring solutions to local realities.

In the upcoming posts, we will look more closely at each layer of the AI stack, and consider what India’s regulatory response should look like.

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A significant development is the CCI’s conditional approval of Bharat Forge Limited’s (BFL) acquisition of AAM India Manufacturing Corporation Private Limited (AAMCPL), its first order involving a detailed Phase II investigation since 2019 (Schneider/ L&T). Although the transaction was cleared in April, the detailed order was only published last month.

On the enforcement front, the CCI issued four orders in July: two closure orders, one order directing an investigation, and one final decision.

A detailed summary of each order is provided below.

CCI clears Bharat Forge’s acquisition of AAM India Manufacturing with a Hold-Separate remedy (CCI’s order available here)

The CCI recently published its detailed order green-lighting the acquisition of AAMCPL by BFL. The acquisition was cleared after a detailed Phase II investigation and was ultimately approved, subject to behavioural commitments.

Transaction: BFL, a global manufacturer of forged metal components, acquired AAMCPL's entire shareholding and its e-axle assembly lines. Both AAMCPL and BFL's existing joint ventures - Meritor HVS (India) Ltd and Automotive Axles Ltd (Affiliate JVs), which are controlled by the BNK family, manufacture axles for commercial vehicles (CVs), often serving the same customers.

Concerns of the CCI: The CCI identified concerns over the combined market power of AAMCPL and BFL’s Affiliate JVs in the broader market for axles for CVs and in the narrower market for axles for medium and heavy CVs (MHCVs). The CCI, in its order, highlighted:

• High market shares: Together, they accounted for around 60–65% of the MHCV axle market (by value and volume for FY 2023–24), far ahead of the next competitor.

• Reduced customer choice and innovation: The removal of AAMCPL as a competitive constraint on BFL’s Affiliate JVs was flagged as potentially reducing customer choice. Based on its analysis of bid data, the CCI observed that BFL’s Affiliate JVs and AAMCPL often competed for the same customers, and the merger could undermine this dynamic. The CCI also cited potential downsides for innovation, especially in proprietary OES-developed products, and highlighted the high switching costs faced by OEMs.

• Substantial entry barriers: The CCI considered that long product development and approval timelines and significant non-financial efforts to enter and credibly compete in the Axle CV market were substantial entry barriers, limiting the likelihood of new competition in the future.

• High input costs: With fewer credible suppliers, the deal could weaken OEMs’ buyer power and lead to higher input costs.

Offer of commitments: BFL voluntarily offered commitments in response to the CCI’s show cause notice, in March 2025. As these did not fully resolve the CCI’s concerns, the CCI initiated a detailed Phase II investigation. At this stage, BFL revised its voluntary modifications, which were ultimately accepted by the CCI.

Hold-separate commitments: The commitments were intended to preserve effective competition between BFL’s Affiliate JVs and AAMCPL, through a hold-separate arrangement that would subsist for seven years. During this period, AAMCPL and the Affiliate JVs would function independently, with distinct branding, sales teams, and no joint marketing or bidding. BFL also committed to issuing communications to the target’s customers and vendors about the hold-separate arrangement.

Measures detailed by the CCI: The order details measures such as ring-fencing competitively sensitive information through dedicated IT systems, NDAs, and regular compliance audits; undertaking regular competition compliance programs, and appointing a competition compliance officer; ensuring no interference in the operations of Affiliate JVs and overriding any conflicting rights under existing JV agreements. The CCI also directed that a monitoring agency would ensure the parties’ adherence to these commitments and regularly report to the CCI during the 7 year period. The granularity of these safeguards are a useful indicator for companies on protecting against the improper disclosure of commercially sensitive information, from a larger competition compliance perspective.

The granular safeguards, which include measures like using dedicated IT systems to isolate sensitive information, implementing non-disclosure agreements, and conducting regular compliance audits, provide a broader lesson for competition compliance. These steps demonstrate effective ways to protect commercially sensitive information and strengthen internal compliance programs. The order also highlights the importance of stakeholder engagement, as the CCI proactively involved stakeholders at two different stages of the merger review: first, at its discretion before a preliminary opinion was even formed, and again later during a public consultation in the Phase II investigation.

CCI closes cartelisation allegations in relation to the allotment of coal blocks (CCI’s order available here)

The CCI recently dismissed a complaint alleging cartelisation and bid-rigging in India's coal mine auctions. The complaint was filed against several major groups, including the RP-Sanjiv Goenka Group, Adani Group, and Aditya Birla Group, among others. The auctions, held in 2015 and 2023, were for the re-allotment of coal blocks that were previously canceled by the Supreme Court of India in 2014.

The CCI dismissed the case on the following key grounds:

• Tendering authority flagged no concerns: The CCI consulted the Ministry of Coal (MoC) which verified that the auctions followed due process and had found no evidence of cartelisation or bid-rigging. The MoC further pointed out that the 2015 auctions had been upheld by multiple High Courts and had included at least three independent companies in each e-auction.

• Indirect and circumstantial evidence: In relation to the 2023 auctions, the CCI found the evidence provided by the informant to be indirect and circumstantial. Without a complaint from the MoC and with the participation of an independent third bidder, the CCI did not see a prima facie case to initiate an investigation.

• Delay in filing: The CCI declined to condone the delay in filing the complaint regarding the 2015 Sarisatolli mine auction. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India’s (CAG) report, which the informant had referenced, was made public in 2016. The CCI found the informant's explanation of a lack of knowledge until 2023 to be insufficient, and concluded that a delayed probe would serve no purpose, especially given the MoC's lack of concern and the prior validation of the auction by High Courts.

​​This decision highlights that the CCI is unlikely to intervene based on circumstantial evidence, especially when the relevant government body expresses no concerns. It also shows that the CCI will carefully consider the informant’s conduct and the public interest when deciding whether to condone a delay, in the context of the newly-introduced three-year limitation period.

CCI initiates investigation against Asian Paints (CCI’s order available here)

The CCI has launched a formal investigation into Asian Paints following a complaint by Grasim Industries. Grasim Industries alleged that Asian Paints engaged in several anti-competitive practices:

• Forcing exclusivity on dealers: Asian Paints reportedly coerced dealers into exclusive arrangements by using threats to reduce credit limits, raise sales targets, or withdraw incentives like foreign travel and club memberships.

• Restricting use of tinting machines: The company allegedly pressured dealers to return or not use tinting machines supplied by Grasim, thereby limiting consumer choice and restricting technical development in the market.

• Arbitrary incentives: Asian Paints purportedly offered non-uniform, arbitrary incentives to dealers in exchange for exclusivity, rather than basing them on objective or performance-based criteria.

• Denial of market access: Grasim also claimed that Asian Paints pressured suppliers, warehouse owners, and transporters not to provide services to them, making it difficult for a new entrant to access essential distribution channels.

After reviewing the evidence, including dealer surveys, affidavits, and correspondence, the CCI made the following prima facie findings:

• Dominance: The CCI's preliminary assessment notes that Asian Paints was dominant in the market for organized decorative paints in India, based on several factors, including the company's significant market share, its extensive network of dealers, and the substantial barriers that prevent new competitors from entering the market.

• Unfair Conduct: Based on a preliminary assessment, the CCI found that the allegations against Asian Paints, involving unfair conditions, enforcing exclusivity, and foreclosing market access, may be in contravention of the Competition Act, 2002 (CA02). Consequently, it has directed an investigation into the matter.

The CCI previously examined allegations against Asian Paints, filed by JSW Paints, regarding abuse of dominance in the decorative paints market. Finding no evidence of contravention, the CCI closed the case. However, JSW Paints has since challenged this decision before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The outcome of this appeal could have significant implications for how such cases are assessed by the CCI going forward.

The CCI Penalises Publishers’ Association for Price Fixing (CCI’s order available here)

The CCI has once again penalised the Federation of Publishers’ and Booksellers’ Association in India (FPBAI) for engaging in anti-competitive practices, following an earlier penalty in 2021. The order followed a complaint alleging cartelisation, specifically through currency rate fixing, discount and supply term restrictions.

The complaint highlighted four key issues:

• Fixed currency exchange rates, although labeled “suggestive”: FPBAI’s Good Offices Committee (GOC) was found to be imposing inflated currency conversion rates, typically 3–5% above the RBI reference rate, for the benefit of a select group of importers. While the GOC later claimed these rates were merely “suggestive,” the CCI noted this labeling came only after proceedings were initiated, viewing it as an afterthought. In practice, these rates were widely followed by booksellers across India and effectively amounted to price fixing.

• Discount restrictions: In its previous order in 2021, the CCI found FPBAI’s discount control practices anti-competitive and directed it to cease such conduct. Despite this, similar allegations resurfaced, with FPBAI failing to adequately inform its members about the CCI’s decision. The CCI noted the lack of compliance but refrained from penal action due to perceived ambiguity. FPBAI has now been directed to raise awareness of the order and submit a compliance report within two months.

• Restrictive supply terms: The CCI found that FPBAI’s GOC circulars prescribing commercial terms like credit period and interest rates, though claimed to be suggestive, had, over time, become industry norms. These terms limited members' freedom to negotiate, creating barriers for new entrants.

• Appeals to only deal with approved vendors: The CCI found that FPBAI’s past advisories urging institutions to buy only from its approved vendors, along with circulation of vendor lists, had the effect of restricting competition. Despite no new advisories being issued post-2021, the earlier ones remain unwithdrawn, influencing procurement practices. This created entry barriers for non-members and distorted buyer choice.

The CCI’s decision aligns with its past orders (Association of Chemists and Druggists), holding that discounts or restrictive supply terms by trade associations can chill competition and standardize market behaviour. Such conduct, though seemingly non-binding, may still violate the CA02 if it controls market conditions or fixes prices.

Equally, the CCI emphasized that compliance efforts must go beyond formal withdrawal of circulars or policies. Simply removing documents from a website is insufficient. Effective compliance requires meaningful sensitisation of members to ensure that the anti-competitive effects are actually corrected and the intended objectives of the CCI’s directions are achieved.

The CCI found the FPBAI in contravention of cartel provisions for price-fixing and market control. It fined FPBAI an amount of INR 2,56,649. The CCI also penalised three of its office bearers and directed FPBAI to implement compliance measures, including withdrawing non-compliant circulars and conducting awareness programs.

CCI closes case against Cholamandalam MS General Insurance and Central Bank of India (CCI’s order available here)

The CCI closed a case against Cholamandalam MS General Insurance (CMGI) and Central Bank of India (CBI), filed by a Chennai-based MSME owner. The owner claimed that CMGI and CBI delayed providing his insurance documents, which led to a late claim rejection after his unit was destroyed by floods in 2015.

The CCI dismissed the case on two key grounds:

• Delay in filing: The complaint was filed nearly ten years after the floods. The CCI found the informant’s reasons (financial hardships and health) for the delay insufficient to waive the three-year limitation period.

No dominant position: The CCI found that CMGI does not hold a dominant position in the Chennai general insurance market, which has several major competitors. As a result, there could be no abuse of dominance.

The Standing Committee Report provides a comprehensive roadmap for the evolution of the CCI, particularly concerning its oversight of the burgeoning digital economy. It supports a shift in regulatory approach - moving from a reactive, ex-post framework to a proactive, ex-ante model to effectively address the unique challenges posed by digital markets. However, it advises that DCB's implementation should be careful, gradual, and based on evidence. This approach is necessary due to capacity limitations and concerns from stakeholders regarding the DCB’s impact on innovation and the compliance burden on startups and MSMEs.

The Standing Committee Report benefits from extensive input from the CCI and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) - the nodal ministry responsible for guiding India’s competition law and policy. It is expected to influence and guide potential amendments to the DCB before its consideration by the Indian Parliament.

The key takeaways from the Standing Committee Report are provided below. A summary of the Standing Committee’s discussions with key stakeholders is available here.

A New Playbook: The Digital Competition Bill

At the heart of the Standing Committee’s recommendations is the call for a new DCB. This legislation is envisioned as the primary tool to discipline the potential anti-competitive practices arising from concentration of power in digital markets, which often manifest through practices like self-preferencing, predatory pricing, and the tying and bundling of services.

The Standing Committee advocates for a nuanced and evidence-based DCB, cautioning against blanket prohibitions. It proposes a framework that allows for context-specific assessments, recognising that the Competition Act, 2002, is not adequate to allay the issues posed by the fast-paced digital sector. Key recommendations for the DCB include:

• Thresholds for designations. The Standing Committee Report suggests that DCB's designation and threshold mechanisms should prevent “inadvertent capture of fast-growing domestic firms”.

• Rebuttal Mechanism: To ensure fairness, the Standing Committee Report suggests incorporating a rebuttal mechanism, similar to that in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, allowing companies designated as Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises to challenge this status in exceptional cases.

• Evidence-Based Foundation: Ongoing market studies, such as the one on Artificial Intelligence (AI), should serve as foundational evidence to refine and inform the provisions of the DCB. It cautions against blanket prohibitions of specific conduct, allowing for more context-specific assessments.

• Inclusion of Virtual Assistants: The Standing Committee Report notes the omission of “virtual assistants” from the draft DCB and recommends their inclusion to align with global regulatory practices.

• Non-price parameters. The Standing Committee Report recommends that the CCI should consider non-price parameters like privacy and quality of service when assessing the impact of potentially anti-competitive behavior on consumer welfare.

Shielding Small Players and Fostering Innovation

A central theme of the Standing Committee Report is the protection of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and emerging domestic firms from the dominance of large digital platforms. The Standing Committee has underscored the need to prevent the DCB from inadvertently stifling innovation or capturing fast-growing Indian companies with excessive compliance burdens. To this end, the Standing Committee recommends:

• Reviewing Merger Thresholds: The Deal Value Threshold (DVT) of ₹2000 crore requires reassessment by the CCI and the MCA. This is crucial to ensure the threshold does not become a loophole for large corporations to acquire promising MSMEs without regulatory scrutiny.

• Curbing Predatory Practices: The CCI must proactively investigate predatory pricing and deep discounting by dominant online platforms, which can potentially harm small retailers. The development of specific guidelines on what constitutes anti-competitive pricing is also suggested.

• Ensuring Data Access: Mechanisms must be established to ensure smaller businesses can access data, enabling them to compete effectively against large enterprises that control vast data ecosystems.

Empowering the Regulator: Addressing Institutional Gaps

The Standing Committee recognizes that a proactive regulatory mandate is toothless without a well-resourced and skilled regulator. The complexity of digital markets places a considerable strain on the CCI, demanding expertise in big data, algorithms, and AI. To bolster the CCI’s capabilities, the Standing Committee Report recommends:

• Addressing Human Resource Gaps: The MCA and CCI must expedite cadre restructuring to increase sanctioned strength, particularly for specialised roles in the Digital Markets Division. Flexible engagement models, like short-term contracts for domain experts, should be explored to attract top talent.

• Ensuring Financial Autonomy: The MCA should provide sufficient Grants-in-Aid to meet the CCI’s budgetary needs, reducing its reliance on internal resources. Adequate funding is critical for investing in advanced analytical tools and conducting market studies.

• Strengthening Technical Expertise: Continuous investment in training for CCI staff on emerging technologies is essential, alongside collaboration with academic institutions and international counterparts for knowledge sharing.

• Reducing Litigation Delays: The Standing Committee also highlighted the need to explore measures to reduce delays in litigation and ensure the effective enforcement of CCI orders, including assessing the impact of provisions like the mandated 25% pre-deposit for appeals.

Building Bridges: A Coordinated Regulatory Approach

Given that digital markets are global and intersect with multiple regulatory domains, the Standing Committee Report emphasizes the need for robust coordination.

• At the National Level: The Standing Committee calls for the implementation of the National Competition Policy to foster a unified competition culture across Central and State governments. Enhanced harmony with other regulators, such as the Data Protection Authority and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, is critical to avoid jurisdictional overlaps.

• At the International Level: Strengthening collaboration with global competition authorities is vital. However, the Standing Committee Report also cautions the CCI to remain vigilant against attempts by foreign jurisdictions to unilaterally impose regulations that could undermine India’s regulatory oversight.

Conclusion: An Agile Regulator for an Inclusive Digital India

The Standing Committee concludes that while the CCI has been effective, the increasing complexity of the digital sector necessitates a significant evolution. The proposed DCB is a vital step, but its implementation must be managed through a nuanced, phased, and evidence-based approach that considers the CCI’s capacity constraints and avoids placing undue roadblocks to innovation. By proactively engaging with stakeholders, conducting forward-looking market studies, and building its institutional capacity, the CCI can establish itself as an agile and effective regulator, fostering a competitive, innovative, and inclusive digital landscape in India.

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