Welcome to the latest edition of Keeping Up with Competition, where we highlight the key competition law developments from July 2026.
Last month, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) penalised HP India and some of its resellers for rigging bids in government tenders through a hub-and-spoke cartel. The regulator also closed multiple proceedings against players such as Godrej & Boyce, Nissan Motor India and Jindal Stainless, drawing a distinction between anti-competitive conduct and objectively justified business practices. Additionally, the CCI advanced its commitments framework by seeking public comments on measures offered by InterGlobe Aviation (IndiGo), as part of its ongoing inquiry. This comes on the heels of a Parliamentary review of the CCI’s new regulatory frameworks for penalty computation and settlements & commitments, which outlined strategic recommendations for their improvement.
The Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court) dismissed two statutory appeals, including an appeal lodged by the CCI challenging the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (NCLAT) decision to set aside the CCI’s penalty on Grasim and remand the case for a fresh hearing.
We discuss these developments below.
1. CCI penalises HP India in Hub-and-Spoke Bid Rigging Case (see here and here)
On 13 July 2026, the CCI fined HP India and several Tier-2 resellers for bid rigging on the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) between 2017 and 2020. The penalty followed an investigation into government tenders for the procurement of Personal Systems (e.g., laptops, desktops) and Supplies (e.g., ink, toner).
The CCI classified the conduct as a “hub-and-spoke” arrangement involving price control, access restrictions, and cover bidding. We covered the key legal takeaways from the decisions last month, in our blog post available here.
CCI underscores legitimate business justifications and highlights a rising evidentiary standard across several closure orders
Last month, the regulator issued several closure orders under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act) distinguishing between prohibited anti-competitive behaviour and objectively justifiable business conduct.
Procurer’s right to specify tender conditions: The CCI dismissed bid rigging allegations in two cases, upholding procurers’ prerogative to set tender conditions and eligibility criteria to suit their requirements. The CCI’s approach in these cases indicates that informants must clear a high evidentiary bar to establish bid rigging even at the prima facie stage.
Godrej & Boyce - The CCI dismissed allegations of bid rigging and abuse of dominance against Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (Godrej) and 15 government agencies, clarifying that the following factors are insufficient to establish a finding of bid rigging:
The mere presence of similarities between technical specifications in a tender and a manufacturer’s proprietary product catalogue (such as Godrej Interio);
Reliance on the direct procurement route for proprietary items when justified by technical requirements, past performance, or the reliability of the product;
Market data indicating a high win rate, which may instead stem from legitimate commercial efficiencies or product suitability rather than cartelisation. The CCI’s order also points out inconsistencies in the informant’s data regarding tender participation and win rates.
The abuse of dominance allegations were dismissed as the CCI found that Godrej was not dominant in “the market for the supply of institutional furniture in India” (as distinguished from the retail segment).
Delhi International Airport Limited - The CCI adopted a similar approach in dismissing bid rigging allegations against Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL). The informant, a director of a security services company, alleged that DIAL had contravened Sections 3 and 4 of the Act by awarding security contracts without competitive bidding. Finding no evidence that DIAL’s tender conditions restricted competition or otherwise contravened the Act, the CCI closed proceedings.
Exclusivity, pricing restrictions and contractual termination prima facie not anti-competitive - The CCI dismissed allegations of refusal to deal, imposition of resale price maintenance (RPM) and unfair exclusivity restrictions against Nissan Motor India Limited (Nissan) by an authorised dealer.
No dominance in the relevant market - The CCI delineated the relevant market as being the market for “distribution and sale of passenger vehicles in India”, rejecting the informant’s construct of a market for Nissan-branded vehicles alone. Given Nissan’s low market share, the CCI held that it was not dominant.
Exclusivity conditions are justified to prevent free-riding - The CCI noted that exclusivity conditions, which restrict distributors from selling competitors’ products, are justified to prevent dealers from free-riding on the manufacturer’s investments in setting up a distribution network. In this case, Nissan’s dealership agreements did not bar dealers from engaging with competing brands outright, but merely required the dealer to seek its prior consent. The CCI also noted that the informant had established a competing dealership, during the term of its dealership agreement with Nissan.
Contractual termination is not a refusal to deal - Termination pursuant to a mutually agreed 90-day, no-fault termination clause reflected ordinary contractual freedom and did not, by itself, constitute an anti-competitive refusal to deal.
Setting a maximum resale price is not RPM - The dealership agreement prohibited sales above a maximum recommended retail price, but expressly permitted sales below this level. In the absence of a minimum resale price or restrictions on discounting, the CCI held that RPM was not established.
Upstream exclusivity and voluntary incentive schemes can be objectively justified - The CCI dismissed allegations of exclusive dealing and abuse of dominance against Jindal Stainless Limited (Jindal) and four Indonesian entities, operating in the stainless-steel supply chain. The CCI’s granular analysis is notable - it analysed relevant markets, actively soliciting supplemental data from both the informant (whose identity was kept confidential) and Jindal, and applied the criteria under Section 19(3) to close proceedings.
Relevant markets and dominance - The CCI identified separate upstream markets for the supply of stainless steel (SS) slabs and SS Hot Rolled Coils (HRC), used as inputs in manufacturing Cold Rolled Stainless Steel (CRSS) in India, the downstream market. The CCI determined that Jindal was prima facie dominant in the downstream market, but not in the upstream markets.
Backward integration and exclusive sourcing justified - The CCI held that Jindal’s exclusive sourcing arrangement with Indonesian suppliers as well as its upstream joint venture for these inputs was a legitimate backward integration initiative, intended to secure long-term access to critical inputs and support expansion of production capacity. It dismissed the informant’s allegations of input foreclosure, noting the absence of any direct evidence of downstream players (including the informant) being denied supply, or exiting the market. The CCI considered the informant’s evidence relating to import patterns, strategic investments and Indonesia’s position in the nickel value chain to be circumstantial, and insufficient to demonstrate market foreclosure, even on a prima facie basis. On the other hand, Jindal listed several domestic and international suppliers of SS slabs and HRC, leading the CCI to conclude that competitors continued to have access to these inputs.
Voluntary purchaser programmes without exclusivity obligations do not establish foreclosure - The CCI also dismissed allegations that the “Jindal Sathi” programme foreclosed Jindal’s competitors from accessing CRSS customers in the downstream market through minimum purchase requirements, discounts and incentives. It accepted Jindal’s submissions that the programme was voluntary, imposed no exclusivity obligations or penalties, and did not prevent purchasers from sourcing from other competitors. It also noted that the programme served legitimate commercial purposes, including preventing counterfeiting and facilitating product traceability. The CCI held that “[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrating customer lock-in, exclusivity, denial of market access, loss of customers, or foreclosure of competing manufacturers” the arrangements did not constitute an abuse of dominance.
Differential charges by digital platforms is not inherently abusive - The CCI dismissed allegations of anti-competitive pricing against Eternal Limited (Zomato), noting that price differences between online orders and offline (in-restaurant) orders are justified. The informant alleged that Zomato adopted a “drip pricing” methodology, charging excessive restaurant commissions, imposed arbitrary platform fees and other charges, without any identifiable service justification. The CCI highlighted that online platforms do provide additional services such as platform access and delivery, that are absent from an in-restaurant purchase, and therefore a price differential between the two models is not inherently abusive. It also recognised the platform’s multi-sided nature, under which the platform fee and delivery fee are charged to consumers while commissions are charged to restaurants.
No inquiry based on generic and unsubstantiated allegations - The CCI also dismissed wide-ranging allegations of bid rigging against more than 4500 entities across sectors ranging from logistics, telecom, GeM procurement, energy, cement, steel, FMCG, pharma and real estate. The CCI clearly articulated its view that it would not initiate inquiries based on generic and unsubstantiated allegations, mirroring its view in some of the cases discussed above. It held that directing an investigation in such circumstances would amount to a “roving and fishing inquiry”.
Taken together, these orders illustrate the CCI’s rising evidentiary threshold for initiating inquiries under the Act. While the regulator is undoubtedly right to reject vague, unsupported claims as a matter of principle, it has also found evidence lacking even when informants point to specific potential infractions. This trend likely reflects the CCI’s well-documented capacity constraints, suggesting that the regulator is becoming increasingly selective and, in its view, intervening only when genuinely justified.
3. Supreme Court dismisses CCI’s appeal against NCLAT order in Grasim Industries inquiry (see here)
The Supreme Court dismissed a civil appeal filed by the CCI against Grasim Industries Ltd. (Grasim), challenging the NCLAT’s remand on grounds of natural justice violations. The NCLAT set aside the CCI’s penalty order and remedial directions, finding that the CCI had failed to provide Grasim an adequate opportunity to defend itself against allegations where the CCI departed from the DG’s view. The Supreme Court’s dismissal reinforces the requirement for procedural safeguards in CCI proceedings, particularly where the CCI’s views impact parties’ liabilities.
See our blog post discussing the NCLAT’s decision here.
4. CCI invites public comments on IndiGo’s commitments to strengthen remedial mechanism for passengers, following December 2025 disruptions (see here)
In its ongoing inquiry into alleged abuse of dominance by IndiGo (covered in our earlier newsletter here), the CCI invited public comments on IndiGo’s commitments offer. IndiGo’s proposed commitments largely aim to address passenger difficulties and strengthen consumer-facing safeguards, which were highlighted in the CCI’s order initiating the inquiry.
5. Rajya Sabha Committee presents report reviewing CCI Regulations on Settlements, Commitments and Penalties
Last month, the Rajya Sabha Committee presented its Report, highlighting key issues and targeted recommendations for a maturing, rigorous antitrust landscape. These include a strong push for the use of its settlements and commitments framework, urging global benchmarking, aggressive penalty enforcement against repeat offenders and increasing transparency in penalty computation to withstand appellate review. Read our detailed analysis (here).